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Abstract 
 
Author: Abigail Griffin  
 
Title: Cooperation between Adversaries: The US and Russia’s Joint Effort against the Islamic 
State in Syria 
 
The Syrian civil war has generated international media attention and interest since it 
broke out in 2011 as an Arab Spring uprising. The local conflict quickly became 
internationalized with two major coalitions at odds with each other—one supported by the 
United States and the other by Russia. The Russian coalition has included and backed the Assad 
regime in Syria, while the American coalition has supported several opposition groups and 
conducted air strikes against the Syrian government. However, the United States and Russia have 
managed to work together against a common enemy—the Islamic State. Cooperation is difficult 
to achieve, even between allies; oftentimes individuals defect in favor of their self-interests 
instead. Then how have the US and Russia managed to overcome their differences and incentives 
to defect and cooperate (avoiding war with each other) against the Islamic State? The answer 
rests in a thorough understanding of game theory and the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in which 
the two coalitions find themselves trapped. 
 
The first chapter of this thesis introduces a few major concepts of game theory that are 
necessary to understand the analysis of American-Russian relations in Syria. This chapter 
provides foundational theory and methodology from Mancur Olson and Robert Axelrod, 
including an explanation of the Prisoner's Dilemma and why the model fits the Syria case study. 
It also provides context about the war in Syria and the US-Russia relationship in the conflict.  
 
The second chapter discusses the two coalitions, their beliefs about punishment, and 
credible deterrence. In this chapter, the strategic concepts of deterrence and reciprocity are 
established and applied to the case study. In chapter three, the Prisoner's Dilemma model is 
applied to US-Russia relations over time, tracking the game between the two great powers. 
Specifically, major examples of American and Russian cooperation and defections are extracted 
from media sources and subsequently analyzed. 
 
Finally, there is explanation of why punishment strategies and deterrence are the reasons 
for American-Russian cooperation and predictions about what cooperation between Washington 
and Moscow will look like in the war moving forward.  
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“In situations where each individual has incentive to be selfish, how can cooperation ever 
develop?”1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, pg. 1. The answer to US-Russian cooperation in Syria is developed 
from the application of Axelrod’s theory to real-world instances of defection and cooperation between the American 
coalition and Russian coalition in Syria, as reported on by major, internationally recognized media sources like BBC, 
The New York Times, The Atlantic, CNN, and Reuters, as well as the US Government and the United Nations.  
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I. The Puzzle: US-Russian Cooperation in Syria 
Introduction 
 It likely seems intuitive to believe that actors with common interests and goals are 
inclined to cooperate and work together effectively to achieve these shared goals. If everyone 
wants the same thing, it is reasonable to assume everyone will work together to accomplish it. 
According to Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups, “Groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on behalf of their 
common interests, much as single individuals are expected to act on behalf of their personal 
interests.”2 However, this expectation is often unrealistic. Cooperation among group members is 
not easy to achieve, even among parties who want similar things. Oftentimes, individual interests 
trump group interests, and actors become inclined to defect against the group in order to gain 
more individually. Even in cases of common interests, there is always a way for individual actors 
to be more successful, and this usually involves defection instead of cooperation. In many cases, 
“what is best for each person individually leads to mutual defection, whereas everyone would 
have been better off with mutual cooperation.”3  
Think about group projects for example. Even if every individual wants an "A" on an 
assignment, different group members will understand success and the best way to achieve 
success differently, and they will also contribute to the final product at varying rates. Group 
work frequently results in cooperation failure—sometimes at the expense of gaining the shared 
objective. Thus, even allies and coalition partners are incentivized not to cooperate with one 
                                               
2 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action,1965 
3 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984, pg. 9 
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another. And since it is difficult for actors on even the best of terms to cooperate, why would 
enemies or adversaries ever cooperate? 
This is the puzzle in Syria. Washington and Moscow have managed to cooperate against 
the Islamic State despite reasonable expectations of constant defections. There are two major 
points that make US-Russian cooperation counterintuitive: (1) the two states have opposing 
interests in the Syrian civil war and its outcome, and (2) there is significant historical animosity 
between the two countries. Focusing on the war in Syria, the US and Russia have implemented 
policies that directly oppose one another and are supporting adversarial actors in the conflict. 
Since 2011, Russia has fervently supported Assad and his regime against the opposition, joining 
the war in 2015 to provide further military resources and political leverage to the Syrian 
government against the rebels. Russia’s goal has been to keep Assad in power and maintain its 
single military base outside of the former Soviet Union and influence in the Middle East. In 
order to do this, Russia has conducted air strikes in Syria, provided military resources to the 
government forces, and vetoed eight United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 
against Syria since the outbreak of the war.4  
The United States, on the other hand, has opposed the Assad regime since the outbreak of 
the war and supported specific Syrian rebels against the government, including the Syrian 
Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Kurds. For example, from 2013-2017, the CIA ran a covert 
program called “Timber Sycamore,” training and arming insurgents against the Islamic State and 
the Syrian regime.5  Both the US and Russia’s foreign policies also include limiting the other 
side’s influence in and access to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  
                                               
4 Euan McKirdy, “8 times Russia blocked a UN Security Council resolution on Syria,” CNN, 21 July 2017 
5 Faysal Itani, “The End of American Support for Syrian Rebels Was Inevitable,” The Atlantic, 21 July 2017  
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In addition to the recent American-Russian tensions regarding the war in Syria, the two 
states have historically harbored animosity for the other. Malevolence between Washington and 
Moscow climaxed after World War II during the Cold War, and relations between the two 
countries have been tumultuous ever since, especially as Russia attempts to regain parity with 
America (in Syria specifically and on a global scale). The United States and Russia are certainly 
estranged allies and frequently considered enemies. The two nations have starkly different 
visions for an ideal international system, and each prioritizes differing ideals and principles. The 
generally accepted stereotype is that Washington and Moscow do not like one another and rarely 
share common interests. So how have they managed to cooperate in Syria? 
Well, “the foundation of cooperation is not really trust, but the durability of the 
relationship.”6 The essence of, and motivation behind, cooperation is not actually necessitated by 
affinity for other actors or the desire to accomplish common goals. Cooperation develops when 
players recognize that it is a better option than alternatives in the long-term (and sometimes 
short-term); therefore, even opponents can achieve mutual cooperation if certain preconditions 
exist. An appropriate model for two-player cooperation and defection is the classic Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD). In the case of Syria, the US and Russia are trapped in an iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (IPD), meaning the relationship is continuing indefinitely and the two must decide for 
each iteration of the game whether to defect or cooperate. They both have incentives to defect, 
and in a single PD situation, the best strategy for both sides is mutual defection. However, the 
social optimum, which is better than the outcome of mutual defection, can be reached with 
mutual cooperation. In this particular case, Washington and Moscow are incentivized to defect 
mutually in order to achieve their opposing goals in Syria; however, the social optimum is the 
                                               
6 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984, pg. 182 
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defeat of the Islamic State. It is important to understand that cooperation between the US and 
Russia is not synonymous with collaboration. The US and Russia’s cooperation in Syria is 
highlighted by the ability of the two great powers to avoid an escalation of mutual defections and 
go to war. Thus, cooperative moves are defined as actions that prevent the US and Russian 
coalitions from going to war with each other. Mutual defections are situations that, if continued 
or escalated, could eventually lead to war. 
Therefore, cooperation in Syria is avoiding a great-power war. Since the United States 
and Russia have managed to avoid war with each other, they have clearly managed to obtain a 
strategy, or decision rule—a specification of what to do in any situation that may arise7--of 
mutual cooperation. Now the question is, how? How have they managed to achieve mutual 
cooperation when both should be inclined to defect, unilaterally taking advantage of the other’s 
cooperation? 
 
 
Theory & Methodology: 
One of the most cited and foundational works for the study of game theory and collective 
action is Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups, which was the first publication to challenge the instinctive assumption of group 
inclination to cooperate based on common interest(s). Instead, he proposed the theory of 
collective action problems and the problem of public goods. Olson thoroughly examines the 
logic behind collective action and how it pertains to economists, political scientists, sociologists, 
and other scholars when looking at group dynamics and rational human interaction. He shows 
                                               
7 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984 
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that individuals in groups are more incentivized to work unilaterally for themselves than for a 
shared goal. Oftentimes collective action problems involve public goods, which are non-
excludable and non-rivalrous, meaning (a) no one can be excluded from benefitting (or suffering) 
from the good, and (b) the consumption of the good by one member does not affect consumption 
by someone else. In these cases, there are issues of burden sharing and free-riding. In the 
example of Syria, the defeat of the Islamic State can be considered a public good, but 
determining contributions to the fight against IS is a burden sharing problem. Countries, 
especially Russia who has specific interests in the war that it would rather pursue, are inclined to 
free-ride—benefit from the good with minimal commitment to its achievement. From this central 
book published in 1965 came extensive scholarship and literature on collective action problems 
and selective incentives.  
Mancur Olson focuses on several possible solutions to the Prisoner’s Dilemma. He 
predominantly suggests that selective incentives— “incentives that may be used to mobilize a 
latent group”8 –are the primary way to solve a PD. Selective incentives can be almost any private 
good that changes the individual’s preferences and makes them more inclined to cooperate than 
defect. Selective incentives may be economic, political, or social. However, this explanation is 
insufficient to understanding cooperation between the United States and Russia in Syria. Russia 
has not offered the United States any special concessions or rewards for cooperation in Syria, nor 
has the United States offered Russia selective incentives. Thus, Olson’s theory is insufficient to 
understanding the Russian-American PD in Syria, and there must be another phenomenon that 
has solved the IPD.  
                                               
8 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, 1965, pg. 61 
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The situation in Syria is more compatible with Richard Axelrod’s The Evolution of 
Cooperation. Axelrod’s theory “is based upon an investigation of individuals who pursue their 
own self-interest without the aid of a central authority to force them to cooperate with each 
other.”9 In the case of Russia and the US, both countries are pursuing their own self-interest 
(whether it be cooperating to defeat IS or defecting unilaterally to exploit the other) without the 
influence or enforcement of a central authority. Washington and Moscow are both rational actors 
and sovereign nations, not subject to any central authority or governing body. Both players are 
free to make whatever choices they want, including the choice to defect. The international 
community cannot force the two to cooperate, and they are able to spiral into a continuous 
stream of mutual defection if they wanted. Simply, the international system is defined by de jure 
anarchy and de facto hierarchy. The state of de jure anarchy means that the global order is 
inherently without and primary authority; the state of de facto hierarchy motivates countries to 
work towards obtaining their goals and improve their standing in the system relative to others. 
Therefore, Axelrod’s theory appropriately applies to international cooperation issues, like the 
situation in Syria between Russia and the United States. 
Thus, although Olson creates the general foundation for the case study, Axelrod and 
James Morrow have produced theories that provide a more specific and appropriate framework 
for American-Russian relations in Syria. Morrow’s Game Theory for Political Scientists10  
provides interesting insights into deterrence and reciprocity mechanisms that will be discussed 
later. These theories establish the groundwork for analysis of cooperation between the US and 
Russia in Syria.  
                                               
9 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984, pg. 6 
10 James Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, 1994 
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Instead of selective incentives, the explanation for cooperation between the United States 
and Russia stems from credible deterrence and effective punishment strategies utilized in an 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game. An IPD exists when a game between two players 
continues indefinitely, neither knowing when or how it will end, and each player learns from past 
decisions and considers repercussions for future iterations. Therefore, there is always the 
possibility of continued interaction and consequently the possibility of mutual cooperation. In a 
PD with a definite, known number of moves and iterations, it is almost impossible to develop 
mutual cooperation because the two sides will be rationally inclined to exploit the other as much 
as possible. So the nature of the US-Russia relationship and its inevitable future is critical to the 
development of cooperation between the two powers.  
In order to apply the collective theoretical framework provided by Olson, Axelrod, and 
Morrow to the Syria case study, articles from prominent, internationally credible news 
organizations were collected and analyzed (including The New York Times, CNN, BBC, Reuters, 
The Atlantic, Al Jazeera, etc.). The primary sources of data on the situation in Syria include the 
media, reports from the US Department of Defense and US Department of State, as well as the 
United Nations. Although the contextual argument covers the Syrian war from its beginning in 
2011 to current events as they unfold in 2018, the analysis focuses on the ‘game’ between US 
and Russia from the US’s intervention in 2014 to the near-defeat of IS by the end of 2017.  
 
 
Mancur Olson’s Game Theory and Collective Action: 
  
 
“If the members of some group have a common interest or objective, and if they would all 
be better off if that objective were achieved, it has been thought to follow logically that the 
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individuals in that group would, if they were rational and self-interested, act to achieve that 
objective.”11  
 
It is intuitive to believe that a group of actors with the same interests and goals would be 
inclined to cooperate and work together effectively to achieve these goals. This theory equates 
individual decision-making with group decision-making. Specifically, it assumes that groups act 
based on group interest much like individuals act in accordance with their individual self-
interests. Perhaps this should make sense. If actors X, Y, and Z all want the exact same thing, 
they should theoretically all cooperate and act in ways that invariably help the group meet its 
shared goal. Because the group wants to achieve a specific outcome, X, Y, and Z should also 
want to meet this specific outcome because it serves their individual self-interest.  
 However, this is not how actors actually interact in group settings. Even the most 
rational, self-interested actors working to achieve a collective goal that benefits themselves 
individually will not voluntarily act towards the achievement of the group goal. There are a few 
crucial things to note from Olson’s following assertion regarding the topic of collective action 
and the zero-contribution theory: 
 
“If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they 
will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force 
them to do so, or unless some special incentive, distinct from the achievement of the 
common or group interest, is offered to the members of the group individually on the 
condition that they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the 
group objective.”12   
  
 
                                               
11 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, 1965, pg. 1 
12 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, 1965, pg. 2 
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First, groups composed of rational, self-interested actors will not cooperate exclusively 
on the basis of group/common interest, even if there is unanimity regarding the ultimate goal and 
how to achieve it. Second, the only ways to solve collective action problems and achieve 
cooperation towards a collective goal include: (1) coercion—the use of force or threats to make a 
group or actor do something(s) it would otherwise not do, and (2) selective incentives— “private 
goods made available to [individuals] on the basis of whether they contribute to a collective 
good. Selective incentives can either reward participants or punish nonparticipants.”13  Third, the 
selective incentives must be separate from the group goal.  
However, Olson’s theory does not exclusively solve the Syria puzzle. In the case of 
Syria, there is no third party with enough power or leverage to coerce the US or Russia, and no 
private goods are being offered to either side for cooperation.  
 
 
Robert Axelrod’s Cooperation Theory 
 
“Today nations interact without central authority. Therefore, the requirements for the 
emergence of cooperation have relevance to many other central issues of international politics. 
The most important problem is the security dilemma: nations often seek their own security 
through means which challenge the security of others. This problem arises in such areas as 
escalation of local conflicts and arms races.”14  
 
Robert Axelrod’s theory, as presented in The Evolution of Cooperation is a better 
framework for analyzing the IPD between Russia and the US in Syria and the mutual 
                                               
13 Pamela Oliver, “Selective Incentives,” 2013 
14 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984, pg. 4 
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cooperation established between the opposing coalitions. Axelrod’s book establishes 
“Cooperation Theory based upon an investigation of individuals who pursue their own self-
interest without the aid of a central authority to force them to cooperate with each other.”15 In 
Syria, both the United States and Russia are considered self-interested actors, and since the 
international system is defined by de jure anarchy, there is no central authority to enforce 
cooperation or force either sovereign state to act in a certain way. Additionally, Axelrod argues 
that concern for others, trust, and amicability do not completely solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma—
other factors are required.  
   
Axelrod defines a PD as a situation in which: 
1. The order of the four payoffs from best to worst is: (1) the temptation to defect when 
other player cooperates (T), (2) the reward for mutual cooperation (R), (3) punishment 
for mutual defection (P), and finally (4) the sucker’s payoff for cooperating when the 
other player defects (S). 
2. Players cannot get out of the dilemma by taking turns exploiting each other, since the 
reward for mutual cooperation is greater than the average of the temptation payoff and 
sucker’s payoff. 
 
And the possibility of cooperation requires that: 
1. There is an indefinite number of interactions; players must know that they might meet 
again. 
2. Players can remember other actors and former interactions. 
                                               
15 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984, pg. 6 
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3. Choices today affect the outcome of this iteration and the outcomes of the next ones. 
 
Axelrod concludes that when interacting with other players, it is beneficial to be nice (not the 
first to defect), forgiving (willing to forgive defections to establish mutual cooperation in the 
future), and retaliatory (responsive to others’ defections to prevent future exploitation and build a 
credible reputation of punishment and reciprocity). In the long term, it often hurts an actor to 
constantly attempt to exploit, especially if that actor is willing to utilize punishment mechanisms. 
He also asserts that a player’s reputation is defined by other players’ beliefs about its strategy; 
thus, reputation greatly affects how players play in an IPD, and reputation is established through 
actions and responses during the game.   
 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma:  
  
 
“This basic problem exists when the pursuit of self-interest leads to a poor outcome for 
all…. What is best for each person individually leads to mutual defection, whereas everyone 
would have been better off with mutual cooperation.”16 
 
One of the most commonly addressed and foundational collective action problems in 
game theory is the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a two-player non-zero-sum 
game utilized across social science disciplines that is defined by two strategies: cooperation and 
defection. Zero-sum games are those in which a gain for one side inevitably means a loss for 
another. Therefore, there is only pure competition and no opportunity for cooperation or mutual 
                                               
16 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984, pg. 7, 9 
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benefit. The two sides completely oppose one another.17 In a non-zero-sum game, however, there 
is chance for cooperation to develop because there is some common interest or goal, or there is a 
way for both sides to simultaneously benefit. In the case of the US and Russia in Syria, even 
though they have different interests in the outcome of the war and future of Syria, they have a 
common enemy in the Islamic State and a shared goal of defeating the organization. Therefore, 
the game is not zero-sum. Both sides can benefit concurrently, and a gain for the US does not 
necessarily equate a loss for Russia, and vice versa.  
There are three types of outcomes in a Prisoner’s Dilemma and four payoff categories. 
The outcome types include: 1) cooperation, 2) defection, or 3) exploitation. Cooperation occurs 
when both sides cooperate; defection occurs when both sides defect; and exploitation occurs 
when one side defects while the other cooperates. It is important to remember three major points: 
1) players cannot get out of the IPD by taking turns exploiting each other; 2) reward for mutual 
cooperation is greater than the average of the temptation and sucker’s payoff; 3) there is no 
reason for cooperation to exist if there are a known finite number of interactions, but it can 
emerge when there are an indefinite number of iterations. The players must be able to recognize 
and remember other actors and former interactions with them, and they need to believe the 
choices they make have short-term and long-term consequences.18  
 
“We can name the payoffs in game 2 T > R > P > S, where T is the temptation, R is the 
reward for mutual cooperation, P is the punishment for mutual defection, and S is the 
sucker’s payoff. It is conventional to also assume that R > (T + P)/2. Without this, then 
alternating rounds between cooperation and defection leads to a greater payoff than pure 
cooperation.”19 
                                               
17 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984; James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, 
1994 
18  Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1994 
19 James Holland Jones, “Evolutionary Game Theory,’ Department of Anthropology at Stanford University, 1 
December 2008 
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In order to clarify the IPD model, there are two scenarios below, one dealing with the 
classic prisoner story and the other dealing more specifically with international relations. 
 
 Scenario 1: Assume Criminals A and B rob a bank. They are arrested and interrogated 
separately. In the separate interrogation rooms, each individual is promised a deal if they 
cooperate with the police and defect against their partner in crime. The cost-benefit chart is 
shown below. The numbers represent the number of years each criminal would spend in jail, 
depending on if they cooperated or defected. Higher numbers signify a worse outcome. The two 
options for each criminal are to either cooperate (C) or defect (D).  
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma: Interrogation 
Criminal B 
C                        D 
C 
Criminal A 
  D 
 
When carefully analyzing the cost-benefit analysis of the criminals, it is clear that 
regardless of what the other player does, it is in the self-interest of both criminals to defect and 
turn the partner into the cops. This means that the Nash equilibrium of the game is mutual 
defection since neither player has incentive to switch strategies. Regardless of Criminal A’s 
2yrs, 2yrs  6yrs, 0yrs 
0yrs, 6yrs 5yrs, 5yrs 
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decision, it is in Criminal B’s interest to defect, and vice versa. However, the social optimum 
achieved by mutual cooperation is better for both actors than mutual defection.  
 
Scenario 2: This Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario deals more closely with wartime 
cooperation. The below diagram20 establishes the initial payoffs for cooperation and defection in 
terms of Axelrod's T, S, R, P categories. “The prisoner’s dilemma game is defined such that the 
payoff to a defector playing against a cooperator is greatest; the payoff of mutual cooperation is 
next greatest; the payoff for mutual defection is next greatest; and the payoff to cooperating 
when the opponent defects is least.”21 
 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma: Axelrod 
 
Actor B 
 
C  D  
 
 C 
Actor A 
 D 
 
 
This diagram shows that the best option for each individual player is to defect while the 
other cooperates and receive the temptation payoff. It also highlights that the Nash equilibrium 
of the game—the strategy that neither actor has incentive to change unilaterally—is mutual 
                                               
20 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, pg. 8 
21 James Holland Jones, Evolutionary Game Theory, Department of Anthropology Stanford University, 1 December 
2008 
R=3, R=3 
Reward for Mutual 
Cooperation 
S=0, T=5 
Sucker’s Payoff and 
Temptation to Defect 
T=5, S=0 
Temptation to Defect and 
Sucker’s Payoff 
P=1, P=1 
Punishment for Mutual 
Defection 
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defection. However, the reward for mutual cooperation is still better than the payoff of mutual 
defection. Looking at the US and Russia, this model is applicable because each side can benefit 
most by exploiting the other's cooperation, both sides are incentivized to mutually defect in an 
attempt to achieve their respective goals in Syria, but they have managed to achieve cooperation 
against the Islamic State and avoid war with one another. The threat of war enables them to 
multilaterally adjust their strategy and cooperate. 
 
 
Why the Prisoner’s Dilemma? 
There are many two-player games in game theory, and several are similar to the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma but have different pay-off matrices. So why is the Prisoner's Dilemma the 
best model for US-Russian relations in Syria? Two of the closest competitors to the PD model 
are discussed below. One of these games is called Chicken, and the payoff matrix looks like this, 
where C denotes “continue straight” and S denotes “swerve:” 
 
Chicken: Nuclear Annihilation 
Player B 
C    S 
 C   
Player A 
  S 
 
-100, -100 2, -2  
-2, 2 0, 0 
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As the name suggests, the point of the game is to exploit the other player’s cowardice 
while avoiding destruction. The only way to receive a positive payoff is by continuing straight 
while the other swerves (exploitation). It can be seen as an example of brinkmanship, testing 
how far the other person is willing to go before reaching direct confrontation. Neither side 
benefits from both swerving, they just avoid a possibly catastrophic outcome. In this case, 
assume that two truck drivers are headed full-speed directly towards each other. Either they will 
collide, they will both swerve to avoid each other, or one will change direction to avoid collision 
while the other continues straight. Neither player wants both players to continue straight because 
that is the worst possible outcome for both of them (-100, -100). Each player, however, wants to 
continue straight while the other swerves because that is the biggest payoff for each of them—
the only possible positive payoff, actually. In this game, there are two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibriums at (-2, 2) and (2, -2). When calculating the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium, about 
1/50 times player A will choose to go straight and 1/50 times Player B will choose to go 
straight.22 Because of the threat of head-on collision, most of the time the two players will both 
swerve and not gain or lose anything.  
The argument for Chicken in Syria is founded on the fact that the US and Russia are both 
nuclear powers and assumes that war between the two powers automatically means nuclear 
annihilation. Based on this assumption, Washington and Moscow constantly swerve to avoid 
mutually assured destruction. Perhaps from a macro-perspective, the threat of war between 
countries with nuclear weapons is a game of Chicken; however, a micro-analysis of the game in 
Syria shows US-Russia relations are not a game of Chicken.  
                                               
22 William Spaniel, Game Theory 101: Chicken, Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook, 2011  
   
 
22 
The game in Syria is not Chicken because neither side is willing to go to nuclear war over 
Syria, both sides can benefit without just exploiting each other, and the US and Russia have 
opportunities to protect themselves and react to the other side. The deterrence used by both 
Washington and Moscow is not based on nuclear annihilation but rather conventional warfare 
between the two sides. Syria is not a hinge in the international balance of power, the country has 
been effectively destroyed by its civil war, and the US and Russia have different priorities that 
can be reconciled short of nuclear conflict.  Furthermore, there are ways both coalitions benefit 
in Syria that do not involve unilateral exploitation (e.g. through cooperation against the Islamic 
State). The situation in Syria between the American coalition and Russian coalition is different 
than Chicken because even though they are intentionally avoiding the catastrophe of war, each 
side defects more frequently than would be reasonable in a game of Chicken. In a game of 
Chicken, it is likely that they would have collided in war already. However, because they believe 
the threat of war is credible and can retaliate to and protect themselves against minor defections, 
they cooperate instead of directly fight.  
If Syria was a game of Chicken, knowing about the threat of war—especially nuclear 
war—would lead the great powers to simultaneously swerve almost every time, which is not the 
case in Syria. Each side commits minor defections regularly, to the point that defections on a 
limited scale are expected. Additionally, there have been confrontations between the two sides 
that have not resulted in war; whereas in chicken, the direct confrontation is war. There has still 
been conflict, but the two have not developed a pattern of escalation. Additionally, the defeat of 
the Islamic State, which would be a result of both sides ‘swerving,’ does not have a payoff of 
zero for either country. It is a social optimum, which means the world in general benefits from 
the organization’s destruction. Therefore, the US and Russia is still an IPD.  
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Moreover, the primary supporting argument for using Chicken as the model for Syria is 
that both the US and Russia are nuclear powers, and therefore, the payoff matrix recognizes the 
collision of the two actors as nuclear war. This assumption, however, implies that direct conflict 
between the two states would lead to nuclear war. First of all, there has been direct conflict 
between the US military and Russian mercenaries, which did not escalate into any military 
confrontation.23 So, conflict has already arisen without nuclear destruction (and conventional 
warfare, for that matter). A war between the US and Russia in Syria would not necessarily 
escalate into a nuclear war, either, especially since Syria is not a high-stakes enough actor. If 
Syria was a hinge in great power politics, maybe the threat would be greater, but Russian 
presence in Syria is not new and Assad’s likely victory will not shift the status quo system. The 
conflict Washington and Moscow are avoiding involves the clash of American and Russian 
military forces on a non-nuclear level.  
On a large-scale perhaps war between two nuclear powers is always a game of Chicken 
to an extent, however, individual scenarios that involve nuclear powers are not necessarily games 
of Chicken. The most notable Chicken scenario between nuclear powers existed between the US 
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War post-World War II. The period from 1946-1981 marks 
a time of global fear and credible nuclear threats. The US and Russia were both rising powers 
armed with nuclear weapons in a re-stabilizing international system, both vying for influence in 
their respective spheres but—more importantly—throughout the world. Also, each side believed 
the other was capable and willing to use its nuclear arsenal if necessary. The Cold War resulted 
from intra-coalition rivalry among the victors of World War II because of fundamental 
                                               
23 Adam Taylor, “What we know about the shadowy Russian mercenary firm behind an attack on U.S. troops in 
Syria,” The Washington Post, 23 February 2018 
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disagreement regarding the splitting of the spoils and the establishment of a new international 
order. Conflict within victorious coalitions is not uncommon, especially when coalitions are 
large and there is no great power anchor. In this case, two major actors in the coalition were 
competing for the status of great-power anchor/hegemon, and they both had nuclear weapons as 
leverage. 
Syria is not another Cold War or a major nuclear threat. Even though there is threat of 
war between the US and Russia, the scale is much smaller, and neither power is interested in 
pushing the other to the edge. Syria is not important enough to either side’s foreign policy to 
justify using nuclear weapons, even in a military skirmish between the two states. One main 
difference is that the two countries are already established powers. Granted, Russia’s power may 
be increasing and the US’s power and influence is arguably decreasing, the shift in power is not 
great enough to incite nuclear violence, and the United States remains the hegemon for now. 
Russia is not aiming to destroy the US; Russia wants parity with the US. Additionally, the two 
powers are interested in Syria for influence in the region, not the whole world, and quite frankly, 
Russia has already effectively won that battle. Syria is predominantly destroyed, and it looks 
almost indisputably like Assad will remain in power, which means Russia will remain influential 
in the country. Moreover, there is no shortage of animosity against the United States in the 
MENA region, so its influence is already decreasing without the involvement of Russia (and 
fighting a costly war in Syria to regain American influence would just be bad politics 
considering its wars have been the main detriments to its reputation in the first place). Thus, in 
the Cold War, the world was broken down into two large and easily susceptible spheres of 
influence, which is different than the current geopolitical situation. 
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The US-Russia power struggle in the Middle East is actually more centralized on the 
issues between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Considering the status of the Iran Nuclear Deal and Saudi 
Arabia’s new prerogative to gain nuclear weapons if Iran does,24 that situation is likely to be 
more of a Chicken situation than Syria. Additionally, there is no arms race in Syria. The war has 
been predominantly conventional, the only exceptions being chemical weapons utilized by the 
Syrian regime.25 Moreover, neither the US nor Russia have made threats to use nuclear weapons, 
whereas in the Cold War, the threats of nuclear attacks were constant and believed to be very 
real.  
Syria, moreover, is just a proxy for the two powers’ greater foreign policy interests 
(which do not in either case involve nuclear annihilation). The United States wants regime 
change, and Russia wants Assad’s Moscow-friendly government and continued access to 
military bases in the country. Neither country is looking for the destruction of the other, which is 
different than the Cold War, where the destruction/defeat of the other side was each state’s 
primary foreign policy goal. Although both sides are using mostly the same proxies in the 
Middle East as they did in the Cold War (the US being more successful with Sunni governments 
like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while Moscow has been more successful exerting influence in 
the Shi’a regimes like Syria and Iran), but neither Russia nor the US are threatening nuclear war 
over these proxies. In Syria, they have a common enemy that unites them to some extent (the 
Islamic State), and Washington and Moscow are more focused on the Syrian war than on the 
military defeat of the other.  
                                               
24 Joshua Berlinger, “Saudi Arabia warns it will pursue nuclear weapons if Iran does,” CNN, 15 March 2018; BBC, 
“Saudi Arabia pledges to create a nuclear bomb if Iran does,” 15 March 2018 
25 Al Jazeera, “Chemical attacks in Syria: Since 2013, thousands of Syrians have been injured and hundreds killed 
by chemical warfare,” 14 April 2018  
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Additionally, when caught in a game of Chicken, neither side has the opportunity to 
protect itself from the other. When the two cars are accelerating towards each other, they cannot 
react to the other’s move. The only interaction between the two actors is complete destruction. In 
an IPD, however, the two sides can and do protect themselves from exploitation by the other and 
are given opportunities to react appropriately to defection. Mutual defection in Syria has not and 
will not be immediate nuclear annihilation. In fact, following the American and Russian response 
to direct conflict between the US military and Russian mercenaries, it will not even be 
conventional warfare. Therefore, the game the US and Russia are caught within in Syria is not 
Chicken but rather a Prisoner’s Dilemma where each side exploits the other only to the extent 
that the other side will (likely reciprocate and) forgive.  
The Cold War was clearly a game of Chicken because it was defined by Brinkmanship, 
and each side swerved even when threatened (like in the Cuban Missile Crisis) to avoid a full-
scale nuclear war with mutually assured destruction. The Syrian civil war may involve two 
nuclear powers (roughly the same nuclear powers—the United States and Russia), but it does not 
tempt either to use nuclear weapons. Therefore, the war in Syria is a Prisoner’s Dilemma marked 
by defections that could lead to conventional military conflict between the US and Russia. The 
current gave the US and Russia are trapped in is focused on conventional warfare, not nuclear 
war. Their cost-benefit analyses definitely include the acknowledgment that the other side has 
nuclear weapons, but they are not thinking about nuclear reciprocity or escalation for 
conventional defections.  In fact, the recently re-elected Russian President Putin stated that he is 
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opposed to any arms race in the future and wants to work with other countries in diplomatic 
ways to deal with international issues.26  
Another possible game worth exploring is the Hawk-Dove game, which is a spin-off of 
Chicken. In this game, there are two players that can either choose to be hawk-like or dove-like. 
Hawks always fight and doves always concede to a fight. When a hawk and dove meet, the hawk 
takes full advantage of the dove, who backs down. When two doves meet, they cooperate and 
split the resource/good. When two hawks meet, they each have a 50% chance of beating the 
other, and each of them incurs costs in the fight, and “the cost of the conflict reduces individual 
fitness by some constant value c.”27 In the table below, v represents the resource both players 
desire and c represents the cost incurred. Both v and c are greater than zero.28  
 
Hawk-Dove: Exploitation 
Player B 
Hawk   Dove 
          Hawk    
Player A 
  Dove 
 
                                               
26 BBC, “ ﺒﺎق ﺗﺴﻠﺢ ﺑﻮﺗﯿﻦ ﻓﻲ أول ﺗﺼﺮﯾﺢ ﺑﻌﺪ إﻋﺎدة اﻧﺘﺨﺎﺑﮫ: ﻟﻦ ﯾﻜﻮن ھﻨﺎك ﺳ ” [Translated] “Putin’s First Speech After re-election: 
there will not be an arms race,” 19 March 2018; Al Jazeera, “Putin Tells West he has no ‘plans to accelerate an arms 
race,’” 20 March 2018 
27 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Evolutionary Game Theory,” 19 July 2009 
28 James Holland Jones, “Evolutionary Game Theory,” Department of Anthropology at 
Stanford University, 1 December 2008 
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In this game, if one player plays dove, it makes sense for the other player to exploit it and 
play hawk because v > v/2. If v/2-c >0, then both players are incentivized to play hawk, and the 
(Hawk, Hawk) outcome represents the game’s equilibrium. If v/2-c < 0, then there are two pure 
strategy Nash equilibria: (Dove, Hawk) and (Hawk, Dove). The mixed strategy equilibrium is 
such that Player A and Player B both play Hawk with probability v/2c.29  
Although it may initially seem reasonable to consider the relationship between the US 
and Russia in Syria an example of the Hawk-Dove game because the two sides are incentivized 
to exploit each other, there are a few shortcomings that make the Prisoner’s Dilemma a more 
appropriate theoretical application. In this game, both sides choosing to be doves, maintaining 
peace and splitting an outcome, is better for each player than both sides fighting. After all, v/2 is 
always greater than (v/2)-c. In the case of Washington and Moscow, splitting the outcome of 
defeating the Islamic State is better than fighting each other. However, attacking the Islamic 
State still requires cost, usually distributed unevenly with the US carrying the greatest burden. 
Also, the defeat of IS is a public good, which means that its payoff is not v/2 since public goods 
are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. A public good cannot be split.  
Additionally, neither side maintains dove status when taken advantage of by the other’s 
hawk-like decisions, but when they are both hawk-like, there is no direct conflict. There is 
almost always some form of reciprocity to remind the other side a player can be a hawk too. But 
this reciprocity is not a (Hawk, Hawk) outcome because they are avoiding war through 
retaliation, not initiating or escalating it.  Because both the US and Russia are involved militarily 
in Syria, they often play hawks, but they manage to avoid directly fighting each other. 
Additionally, each side is almost always enduring costs. There is never a simple half-half split or 
                                               
29 William Spaniel, Game Theory 101: The Complete Textbook, 2011  
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consumption of an entire resource because they are both involved in the fighting, and fighting is 
costly. Therefore, it would be a misrepresentation of the actual payoffs in the US-Russia game to 
use this Hawk-Dove model. The point is that the two countries and their coalitions are not at war 
with each other.  
 So, the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is the appropriate game theory model to address the 
game between the US and Russia in Syria because it directly deals with cooperation and 
defection and can be solved with deterrence and punishment strategies. The payoff matrix is 
most comparable to the one in Syria between the two coalitions.  
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II. The War in Syria & Credible Deterrence 
Syrian Civil War: 
The civil war in Syria has been a prominent American foreign policy issue since it began 
in March 2011. The war escalated from an Arab Spring uprising into an internationalized 
intrastate war involving ethnic factions, Islamic terrorist groups, rebels, government forces, and 
great power intervention. Underlying causes of the war include economic, political, and civil 
instability as well as sectarian division within the country. Some of the proximate causes of the 
war include the influx of Syrians into urban areas because of drought, the other uprisings 
throughout the Arab World (including those in Tunisia and Egypt), and the arrest and brutal 
torture of teenage boys who used graffiti to publicize anti-regime rhetoric on a school building.30  
After President Bashar al-Assad’s regime responded violently to suppress dissent in the 
country, military defectors formed a rebel faction—the Free Syrian Army—and the country 
descended into a civil war that quickly gained additional actors who wanted to take advantage of 
the instability. More rebel factions formed to oppose Assad but also began fighting each other, 
and the Islamic State entered the conflict fighting everyone. Sectarian issues also surfaced in the 
country that is 80% Sunni Muslim but has been dominated by the Alawi sect of Shia Islam for 
decades, and Islamist rebel factions involved themselves in the struggle for state power.31 What 
began as a pro-Assad versus anti-Assad war transformed into a sectarian and international issue, 
                                               
30 CNN Library, “Syrian Civil War Fast Facts,” 3 May 2018; William R. Polk, “Understanding Syria: From Pre-
Civil War to Post-Assad; How drought, foreign meddling, and long-festering religious tensions created the tragically 
splintered Syria we know today,” The Atlantic, 10 December 2013 
31 William R. Polk, “Understanding Syria: From Pre-Civil War to Post-Assad; How drought, foreign meddling, and 
long-festering religious tensions created the tragically splintered Syria we know today,” The Atlantic, 10 December 
2013  
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dividing rebel forces against each other based on Sunni-Shia lines and involving state actors in 
the complicated conglomerate of fighters in Syria. 
Since its escalation, the country has witnessed grave atrocities throughout the center-
driven civil war, including war crimes and crimes against humanity.32 The pre-war population in 
2010 was 21.02 million people. As of December 2017, urgent humanitarian assistance, including 
medical assistance, was required by more than 13.1 million people in Syria, of whom 6.1 million 
were internally displaced, 2.9 million were living in hard-to-reach areas, including Palestinian 
refugees, and hundreds of thousands of civilians were trapped in besieged areas.33 In total, 
almost 500,000 civilians have been killed, over 11 million displaced, and 13.5 million are in 
need of humanitarian assistance. Major actors that have opposed Assad’s regime also oppose IS, 
including the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, Israel, and the Arab 
League.34 The American coalition and Russian coalition are at odds with each other because they 
do not agree on the outcome of the civil war and oppose each other’s influence in the Middle 
East region.  
Syria is not the only country in the MENA region experiencing civil war and 
humanitarian crises. In fact, the UN has referred to the situation in Yemen as “the world’s worst 
humanitarian crisis.”35 The internationalized version of civil war in Yemen—sometimes referred 
to as the 'forgotten war' –has been going on since 2015, killed over 10,000 people, and displaced 
                                               
32 UN News, “Those responsible for war crimes in Syria ‘will be held accountable for what they have done,’ says 
UN rights chief,” 2 March 2018; Lizzie Dearden, “Syria conflict: UN report accuses Assad regime of massacres and 
crimes against humanity,” The Independent, 27 August 2014 
33 UNSC Resolution 2393, 19 December 2017 
34 BBC, “Syria crisis: Where key countries stand,” 30 October 2015; The Guardian, “Syria: who are the key players 
in the conflict?,” 14 April 2018; The Global Coalition, “75 Partners,” 2014 
35 Ewelina U. Ochab, “Yemen Became The World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis,” Forbes, 5 April 2018; Shuaib 
Almosawa, Ben Hubbard, and Troy Griggs, “‘It’s a Slow Death’: The World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis,” The 
New York Times, 23 August 2017  
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about 3 million Yemenis.36 Nonetheless, Syria remains the focus of international attention and 
US foreign policy because of larger American interest, and Syria involves Russia—another great 
power. The United States and Russia have historically struggled against one another to gain 
influence in the MENA part of the world, especially for access to oil resources, military 
advantages, and political alliances. The war in Syria is no exception. Although, the Trump 
administration has made some policy changes that indicate the US may be rethinking its role in 
the Syrian war and pulling out of the conflict, it has been a major direct and indirect actor in the 
war.  
The major players in Syria can be broken down into six categories: the Syrian army, 
secular rebels, Islamist rebels, Kurds, IS, and the anti-ISIS coalition(s). The Syrian army is led 
by President Bashar al-Assad and has almost completely taken back the parts of the country once 
dominated by rebel forces. The Free Syrian Army is a sectarian rebel group formed in 2011 by 
Syrian military defectors to oppose Assad and overthrow the government.37 The Syrian 
Democratic Forces (SDF)  
 
“is a coalition of Kurdish, Sunni Arab and Syriac Christian fighters dominated by its 
Kurdish fighters, especially the Popular Defense Units (YPG) with an all-female branch 
called the Women’s Defense Units, or YPJ. These organizations are Syrian front groups 
for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party or PKK. The other militias involved in the Syrian 
Democratic Forces are either long-standing PKK allies or proxies...or more recent allies 
drawn from the Sunni Arab tribal landscape...and from the remains of small Sunni Arab 
rebel groups crushed by the Islamic State.”38  
 
                                               
36 Al Jazeera, “Key facts about the war in Yemen,” 25 Mar 2018 
37 Al Jazeera, “Syria’s Civil War Explained from the Beginning,” 14 April 2018  
38 Aron Lund, “Origins of the Syrian Democratic Forces: A Primer,” 22 January 2016 
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The SDF has received substantial air support from the United States. Although both of these 
organized militias oppose Assad, the two forces also fight one another because they too are in 
competition for power.  
The other fighters include the Kurds in northern Syria, the Islamic State, and the anti-ISIS 
coalition(s). The Kurds fighting in Syria have attempted to take advantage of the instability and 
take parts of the country as their own, highlighting a more separatist aspect of the overall civil 
war. IS has been determined to create an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Syria, and at its height in 
2014, it controlled “land stretching from central Syria all the way to the outskirts of Baghdad 
including major cities like Mosul, Fallujah, Tikrit, and Raqqa”39 and approximately 10 million 
people.40 The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, led by the United States has worked to contain 
and destroy the terrorist organization. Although it has lost most of its ‘caliphate,’ its fighters are 
still active in Syria and internationally.  Figure 1 divides the country based on territorial control 
in Syria.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
39 Michal Kranz and Skye Gould, “These maps show how drastically ISIS territory has shrunk since its peak,” 24 
October 2017 
40 BBC, “Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps,” 28 March 2018 
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Figure 1: Control of Territory in Syria41 
 
 
 
Therefore, there are four overlapping conflicts in Syria. The main conflict is between the 
Assad regime and the rebels. The second conflict involves the secessionist Kurds, who have been 
fighting the Syrian government and rebel forces, as well as contributing (arguably the most) to 
the US’s campaign against IS. Now they are also fighting Turkey. The third conflict is the 
Islamic State and its fighting to create a state for itself. Finally, the fourth conflict is the 
internationalized aspect of the civil war, involving Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and the US and its 
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allies.42 Iran was the first to enter the fray in support of Syria, and when the rebels started gaining 
momentum, Russia joined the war to prop-up Assad and (it claims) to fight IS in 2015. This 
fourth conflict involving international powers and intervention is what allows the fight against 
the Islamic State in Syria to be considered a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The US and Russian coalitions 
are deeply rooted in all of the aforementioned issues as adversaries, but they have managed to 
cooperate against the Islamic State.  
The presence of the Islamic State in the Syrian conflict causes a pervasive collective 
action problem among the many forces fighting against it, especially since many of them are also 
fighting each other. The international community universally agrees that the Islamic State is a 
dangerous terrorist organization that must be destroyed, but individual actors and coalitions have 
played larger roles in the fight against IS than others. Neither the US nor Russia (the two major 
powers in the conflict) have wanted to work exclusively towards the destruction of IS. All 
warring factions in Syria agree that IS should be destroyed; however, none want to bear the costs 
of expelling/destroying it if they can free-ride instead. The public good is the destruction of IS, 
and the collective action problem comes down to burden sharing.  
 The United States and its global coalition, as well as the Kurds, have contributed the 
most to the fight against the Islamic State in Syria. Figures 2 and 3 show the different actors 
fighting IS and how much territory the terrorist organization has lost since its peak. According to 
the CNN, the “head-spinning” web of actors in Syria fighting the IS looks like Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Alliance and Opposition Networks in Syria Fighting the Islamic State43 
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Beltyukova and Henrik Pettersson for CNN, 11 April 2018 
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Figure 3: IS Territory 2015 vs. 201844 
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As the Islamic State’s presence diminishes in the country, the other forces have more 
opportunity to fight each other, or as in the case of the Kurds, be attacked by major state actors 
(Turkey). Over time, the American and Russian coalitions have supported or opposed all of the 
main players in the conflict, and they each continue to shape their foreign policy around the 
situation in Syria. There is significant confusion regarding actors on the ground, especially 
because many smaller groups change their names and public alliances for political reasons, 
which just continues to worsen an already complex problem. This confusion also makes it 
necessary to categorize the actors in Syria based on coalition alliances in order to follow and 
analyze them, as seen in Figure 4. Considering Washington and Moscow’s roles in the war, this 
division and method of categorization makes sense for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
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Figure 4: Alliance and Opposition Networks in Syria Fighting the Islamic State 
(Annotated) 
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Something interesting about Figure 4 is that it denotes bilateral support between the US 
and Turkey but also Russia and Turkey. In this paper, Turkey is considered part of the US 
coalition because it is explicitly allied with the US, a contributing partner in the Global Coalition 
to Defeat ISIS,45 and the American military has been using bases in Turkey for missions in Syria. 
Nonetheless, Turkey has been working closely with Iran and Russia in negotiating de-confliction 
zones and supporting Russia in its push towards peace negotiations. Also, both Turkey and 
Russia desire the removal of US forces from Syria, so they can each pursue their military 
objectives without fear of causing war with the US. Therefore, since there has been a more direct 
and intimate military and political relationship between the US and Turkey, it is a US ally within 
the US coalition. But it has been an important associate of Russia as well.  
 
 
The Anti-IS Coalitions: 
As noted above in the CNN diagram, there are a large number of actors in Syria, most 
everyone fighting the Islamic State. However, the number makes it difficult for governments 
(and their intelligence services), media outlets, human rights organizations, and even actors on 
the ground to keep everyone straight. Especially because many organizations change names or 
affiliations in efforts to gain military and political support or to escape a particular title, like 
‘terrorist organization.’ But more generally, the conflict can be simplified for purpose of analysis 
and divided into two major great-power coalitions, one led by the United States and the other by 
Russia. It is important to note that the reason there are two coalitions to begin with is because 
Russia chose not to join the US Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS because of differing objectives 
                                               
45 The Global Coalition, “75 Partners,” 2018 
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in the civil war. Explicitly, “U.S. officials say Washington has made no specific request to 
Moscow to join the coalition or work together in the fight against Islamic State. Nor has Russia 
offered to do so, they said. But they acknowledge Moscow’s potential importance in any 
campaign in the Middle East.”46 Because of this separation, Washington and Moscow entered the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, fighting against a common enemy in a greater conflict where the two 
countries oppose each other.  
 In Syria, the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS formed September 10, 2014 and consists of 
75 partners47 (Figure 5) “and is unique in its membership, scope, and commitment. Together the 
Global Coalition is committed to degrading and ultimately defeating Daesh.”48 However, the 
strength of the US coalition has predominantly come from the United States, NATO (primarily 
France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom), and Arab League (Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia).  The Russian coalition consists predominantly of Russia, the Syrian government, 
Iran, and Iranian-backed, Lebanon-based Hezbollah. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
46 Lesley Wroughton and Matt Spetalnick, “Russian suspicions of U.S. motives in Syria make cooperation unlikely,” 
Reuters, 28 September 2014  
47 Figure 4: US Department of State, “The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS: Partners;” The Global Coalition, 
theglobalcoalition.org  
48 The Global Coalition, theglobalcoalition.org/en/partners   
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Figure 5: The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS 
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 “[In 2014, the United Staes] announced the formation of a broad international coalition 
to defeat The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has focused primarily on 
fighting within Syria and Iraq but also dealt with the spread of radicalization and attacks 
internationally. The US Department of State website states: “The Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS) has dramatically undermined stability in Iraq, Syria and the broader 
Middle East and poses a threat to international peace and security. ISIS continues to 
commit gross, systematic abuses of human rights and violations of international law, 
including indiscriminate killing and deliberate targeting of civilians, mass executions and 
extrajudicial killings, persecution of individuals and entire communities on the basis of 
their identity, kidnapping of civilians, forced displacement of Shia communities and 
minority groups, killing and maiming of children, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence, along with numerous other atrocities. ISIS presents a global terrorist threat 
which has recruited thousands of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria from across the globe 
and leveraged technology to spread its violent extremist ideology and to incite terrorist 
acts. As noted in UN Security Council Resolution 2170, ‘terrorism can only be defeated 
by a sustained and comprehensive approach involving the active participation and 
collaboration of all States…’ which is why our first priority is to encourage others to join 
in this important endeavor.”49  
  
 
The initial five tenets of the coalition, as determined in the 2014 NATO meeting that 
created the coalition include: 1) military support; 2) inhibiting the spread of foreign fighters; 3) 
cutting off sources of revenue and funding; 4) dealing with humanitarian crises; and 5) “exposing 
true nature,”50 which I interpreted to mean countering violent extremism by showing the 
weakness and vulnerability of IS and the fallibility of its cause. There are 75 partners within the 
Global Coalition contributing to efforts against IS.  This declaration of a global coalition 
paralleled the American-led intervention in Iraq to fight IS, which officially began under 
President Barrack Obama in 2014. According to the Department of Defense (DoD) the operation 
is called the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve (JTFOIR), designed with 
the explicit purpose to defeat ISIS.  In Iraq the JTFOIR shares advise and assist duties with the 
Combined Joint Task Force Land Component Command (CJTFLCC).  
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According to the Pentagon, JTFOIR is also “the primary advise-assist-and-accompany 
force in Syria…working closely with the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces]. [The JTFOIR] is the 
driving force of working by, with, and through [US] partner forces on the ground in Syria.”51  
The SDF utilized a “multi-ethnic, multi-religious”52 coalition of US-backed Kurds, Arabs, 
Assyrians, Yazidis, Armenians, and Turkmen in its campaign to liberate Raqqa, which lasted 
from June to October 2017.  The SDF and American allies were successful in this campaign and 
have conducted the most attacks against the organization, as shown in Figure 653. However, there 
is not just one coalition in Syria fighting the Islamic State. The Russian coalition is also 
supposed to be fighting the Islamic State, though little to no public records show Russian 
involvement in the fight against IS.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                               
51 US Department of State, “Briefing on the Global Coalition To Counter ISIS,” 13 July 2017 
52 US Department of State, “Briefing on the Global Coalition To Counter ISIS,” 13 July 2017 
53 BBC, “Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps,” 28 March 2018 
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Figure 6: The US-Led Coalition Against IS 
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Why Two Coalitions?  
When the US formed the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, Russia did not take initiative to 
join, and Washington did not press the issue.  “Russia has no desire, no plan and no interest to be 
part of any campaign led by the United States,” said Lukyanov, who is also head of a Kremlin 
foreign-policy advisory panel.54 Nonetheless, Russia has also contributed to the fight against IS, 
although there have been many accusations against Russia that its army has attacked Western-
backed rebels instead of the terrorist organization. In 2014, “Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of 
the journal Russia in Global Affairs, said Russia’s role in the fight against Islamic State likely 
would be limited to assisting the Iraqi and Syrian governments. Moscow already supplied 
weapons to security forces in both countries.”55  Overall, we have seen this to be true, but “In 
September 2015, Russia launched a bombing campaign against what it referred to as "terrorist 
groups" in Syria, which included ISIL as well as anti-Assad rebel groups backed by the USA. 
Russia has also deployed military advisers to shore up Assad's defenses.”56 However, Russia has 
predominantly avoided conflict with the American coalition. Even if the United States and its 
coalition carries the brunt of the anti-IS burden, it is crucial that Russia has kept from 
antagonizing the US.     
Although the two major coalitions in Syria are composed of many different actors, including 
states and international organizations, the PD analysis simplifies the situation because it 
considers the two individual coalitions as units. For the most part, the American coalition 
                                               
54 Lesley Wroughton and Matt Spetalnick, “Russian suspicions of U.S. motives in Syria make cooperation unlikely,” 
Reuters, 28 September 2014. 
55 Lesley Wroughton and Matt Spetalnick, “Russian suspicions of U.S. motives in Syria make cooperation 
unlikely,” Reuters, 28 September 2014.  
56 Al Jazeera, “Syria's civil war explained from the beginning,” 14 April 2018 
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components work together57 and the Russian coalition components work together towards the 
same respective goals. Moreover, the primary reason the threat of war is such a powerful 
deterrent is because it would be between two great power rivals, the US and Russia. Therefore, 
because they are central to the punishment strategies as enforcers and central to deterrence as 
possible combatants, they are the primary actors for analysis.  They are the great power leaders 
of their respective coalitions with influence in the United Nations and military strength 
throughout the world.  
 
 
Beliefs about Punishment  
The US and Russia have managed to solve their Prisoner’s Dilemma problem because of 
their reputations and credible deterrence. A player’s reputation is created based on the beliefs of 
others about the strategy that player will use. A player’s strategy for a game is a complete plan to 
play the game. The interaction of players’ strategies determines the outcomes.58 Deterrence is 
achieved through the establishment of a reputation of reciprocity/retaliation and credible threats 
because “the key to doing well is not overcoming others but eliciting their cooperation.”59 Below 
are definitions of key terms and then explanations of the concepts:  
Deterrence:  
1. “The action of discouraging an action or event through instilling doubt or fear of the 
consequences.”60 
                                               
57 Turkey’s invasion of Syria against the Kurds occurred in January 2018, which is outside the main period of the 
IPD analysis. Prior to this invasion, the Turks and the Kurds primarily focused on the fight against the Islamic State 
instead of each other, promoting the American goals simultaneously if not together. 
58 James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, 1994 
59 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984, pg. 189 
60 English Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/deterrence 
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2. “Military strategy under which one power uses the threat of reprisal effectively to 
preclude an attack from an adversary power. With the advent of nuclear weapons, the 
term deterrence largely has been applied to the basic strategy of the nuclear powers 
and of the major alliance systems. The premise of the strategy is that each nuclear 
power maintains a high level of instant and overwhelming destructive capability 
against any aggression—i.e., the ability, visible and credible to a would-be attacker, 
to inflict unacceptable damage.”61 
Reciprocity and Retaliation: 
1. Cooperating when cooperated with and defecting once defected upon.  
2. Retaliation and reciprocal actions must be a response to another player’s decision 
and must be a relatively proportional response.62 Otherwise, we start breaching 
the territory of revenge.   
3. “Many forms of retaliation are socially productive in that they can improve 
bargaining and make compromise possible.”63 
Negative Reciprocity versus Revenge: 
1. “Negative Reciprocity Norm” in international relations64 “involves a unitary set of 
beliefs [that favors] retaliation as the correct and proper way to respond to 
unfavorable treatment.”65 
                                               
61The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Deterrence: Political and Military Strategy,” Encyclopaedia Britannica 
62 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 
63 Rose McDermott, Anthony Lopez, Peter K. Hatemi, “The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,” World Order, 
Power & Strategy, 2018, pg. 78 
64 Rose McDermott, Anthony Lopez, Peter K. Hatemi, “The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,” World Order, 
Power & Strategy, 2018, pg. 77 
65 Paul Eder et al., “Punishing Those Responsible for the Prison Abuses at Abu Ghraib: The Influence of the 
Negative Reciprocity Norm (NRN), Political Psychology 27, no. 6, 2006, pg. 810 
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2. “Negative reciprocity is usually proportional to the initial harm, triggered by 
anger, and is aimed at recalibrating enemy preferences…. [It] must be measured 
and relatively proportional if cooperation is to be maintained or reestablished.”66 
[Although not all American and Russian decisions are influenced by anger, 
sometimes they are rational responses to provocation, but the two other conditions 
indisputably apply to my case study.] 
3. “Revenge is disproportional to the initial harm, often triggered by hatred, and 
functions to inflict harm on the enemy for the sheer pleasure of extracting 
vengeance.”67 [This is not what we are talking about with the US and Russia in 
Syria.] 
Punishment: 
1. “Evolved as a strategy to make others pay for harms they inflicted… [and is 
designed] to deter future exploitation…. It can also help salvage the possibility for 
future cooperation [and forgiveness] if the aggressor comes into line.”68 
Tit-for-Tat Strategy: 
1. “The most basic form of retaliation is tit-for-tat punishment, in which a harm 
received is responded to with a harm of relatively equivalent magnitude.”69 
Credible Threat: 
1. A threat that is serious, believable, and possible to be executed.  
                                               
66 Rose McDermott, Anthony Lopez, Peter K. Hatemi, “The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,” World Order, 
Power & Strategy, 2018, pg. 77-78 
67 Rose McDermott, Anthony Lopez, Peter K. Hatemi, “The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,” World Order, 
Power & Strategy, 2018, pg. 77 
68 Rose McDermott, Anthony Lopez, Peter K. Hatemi, “The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,” World Order, 
Power & Strategy, 2018, pg. 77-78 
69 Rose McDermott, Anthony Lopez, Peter K. Hatemi, “The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,” World Order, 
Power & Strategy, 2018, pg. 77 
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Deterrence 
“Deterrence is successful when the threat of unacceptable costs prevents an adversary from 
taking some undesired course of action.”70 Importantly, deterrence is learned over time. It is 
unlikely for one instance of reciprocity or retaliation to deter an adversary; rather, deterrence is a 
credible threat of a consistent behavior pattern, such as air strikes in Syria. Deterrence is a 
controversial subject within and outside the political science community because it is nearly 
impossible to prove or measure. After all, if deterrence is working, it means nothing is 
happening. Well, it means something isn’t happening anyway. But how is ‘nothing’ 
measureable? There is no formal mechanism for measuring deterrence. Instead, there are some 
important assumptions that go into understanding and recognizing the existence of deterrence in 
international relations: 
1. The opposing actors (states, in this case) are rational and self-interested.  
2. In a case where two actors are interacting, at least one actor must be individually 
incentivized to behave in a way the other does not like. Simply, Actor A wants to do 
something that Actor B does not want it to do. 
a. Ex. Russia is incentivized to attack Western-backed insurgents in Syria 
because it supports the Syrian regime. The US does not want Russia to 
conduct these types of attacks. 
3. Both actors know, at least to an extent, the desires and preferences of the other. 
Typically, an actor knows what the other actor does and does not want it to do. Actor 
A knows Actor B does not want it to act in a particular way. 
                                               
70 Rose McDermott, Anthony Lopez, Peter K. Hatemi, “The Psychology of Revenge and Deterrence,” World Order, 
Power & Strategy, 2018, pg. 70 
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a. Ex. Russia knows the United States does not want it to attack Western-backed 
rebels in Syria. Rather, it wants Russia to attack the Islamic State.  
4. There is a credible threat of punishment that keeps an actor from acting in its self-
interest to the detriment or disapproval of the other. Actor A does not act in the way 
Actor B disapproves of because it believes Actor B’s threat of punishment is credible. 
The credibility of Actor B’s threat is determined by the belief system of Actor A. 
Does Actor A believe Actor B will act on its threat? If yes, Actor B’s threat is 
credible.  
a. Ex. Russia does not attack Western-backed rebels because it fears the United 
States’s reciprocity and deems the US’s threats of reciprocity and punishment 
mechanisms as credible.  
5. Therefore, deterrence is immeasurable because it inherently means something did not 
happen. Actor A did not act in the way Actor B objected to.  
a. Ex. It is unknown how many times Russia has considered attacking Western-
backed forces in Syria and decided not to do so because of the threat of 
American retaliation. It is only known when Russia has attacked rebels and 
when it has not. 
 
The whole point of deterrence is that something does not happen. However, even though 
a lack of something, or ‘nothing,’ is not entirely measurable, we can still recognize instances of 
deterrence. The success of deterrence in this research context is the ability of the US and Russia 
to avoid war over Syria. Therefore, the lack of an American-Russian war is the indicator of 
deterrence. It is the credible threat that keeps the two sides cooperating, at least against the 
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Islamic State. Deterrence is the mechanism that prevents Russia or the United States from 
defecting and exploiting the other during its cooperation against IS. Without the threat of war, it 
is likely that both sides would try harder to exploit each other in pursuit of their individual 
interests in the Syrian war.  
 
 
Reciprocity 
 “States may act in international crises not for the intrinsic value of the immediate issue, 
but rather to deter future challenges to their interests by building a reputation for responding to 
such challenges.”71 Reciprocity is a key element of building a reputation of responsiveness to 
defections. However, the degree of retaliation is key to the development of deterrence and a 
reputable threat of negative reciprocity: "The injury and response must be balanced. An over-
retaliatory response provokes escalation while an under-retaliatory response provokes 
exploitation.”72 Despite rhetoric of escalation from both Washington and Moscow over the years 
because of defections and reciprocated defections, neither side has wanted to actually escalate 
the tension between the two countries to the point of direct conflict. Therefore, over-retaliatory 
responses to defections have not been prevalent in Syria. However, there have been cases of 
under-retaliatory measures, especially from the United States, that have hurt the US's reputation 
and possibly prompted further defections from the Russian and the Syrian regimes in Syria.  
 “Once the word gets out that reciprocity works, it becomes the thing to do. If you expect 
others to reciprocate your defections as well as your cooperations, you will be wise to avoid 
                                               
71 James D. Morrow, Game Theory for Political Scientists, 1994, pg. 241 
72 Sandra L. Bloom, “Commentary: Reflections on the Desire for Revenge,” Journal of Emotional Abuse 2, no. 4, 
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starting any trouble.”73 Which is great, if there is actually reciprocity. But the opposite is also 
true; if one sides chooses not to reciprocate, it opens it up to exploitation, and the other side may 
be inclined to start trouble. Overall, Syria is an example where the situation has not escalated to 
the brink of war between the US and Russia, which means that the threat of war and reciprocity 
is still credible. However, this does not mean that reciprocity has been utilized effectively 
throughout the whole war. Reciprocity is actually a distinguishing factor between Obama and 
Trump's Syrian policy. Obama was more hesitant to retaliate to Russian and Syrian defections 
than Trump has been.  
A significant example of under-retaliation in Syria came from the side of the US under 
the caution of the Obama administration. It is one of the most widely noted instances of 
American rhetoric regarding Syria—Obama's "red line" against the use of chemical weapons in 
2012.74 Assad used chemical weapons in Khan al-Assal on March 19, 201375  and in Damascus 
on August 21, 2013,76 and the United States (both Congress and POTUS) did little about it. This 
dismissal of Syria and Russia crossing the "red line" dramatically hurt the United States's 
credibility when threatening military action and policy enforcement. The US did take diplomatic 
action in response to the attacks, working with the UNSC (including Russia) to mandate the 
destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, but by not enforcing the red line, it weakened its 
international reputation according to allies and adversaries. Thus, the Obama administration 
never utilized successful negative reciprocity against the Assad regime, even though it achieved 
                                               
73 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984, pg. 189 
74 James Ball, “Obama issues Syria a 'red line' warning on chemical weapons,” The Washington Post, 20 August 
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75 The Associated Press, “Timeline of chemical weapons attacks in Syria,” Fox News, 10 April 2018 
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cooperation from Russia in the UNSC regarding the destruction of Assad's chemical weapons 
stockpile. 
Since his election in 2016, Trump's administration has been more focused on 
implementation of reciprocity. In fact, France and the UK have also been more willing to utilize 
negative reciprocity in Syria. For example, Obama’s failure to enforce his ‘red line’ likely 
influenced French President Emmanuel Macron’s enforcement of his own chemical ‘red line’77 
in the latest air strikes conducted by the US, UK, and France against the Syrian government on 
April 14, 2018.78  In February 2017, Russia and China vetoed a UNSC resolution to sanction 
Syria for its use of chemical weapons. Then, on April 4 of the same year, the Syrian army carried 
out its largest chemical weapons attack since 2013 on the city of "Khan Sheikhoun in the rebel-
held Idlib province."79 President Trump actually blamed President Obama's unwillingness to 
utilize negative reciprocity against the Assad regime for this attack, stating "the 'heinous' actions 
of Assad's government are the direct result of Obama administration's 'weakness and 
irresolution.'" This bold statement may or may not have truth to it, but it obviously shows that 
reciprocity is a priority of Trump, and it highlights the importance of reputation in international 
politics. 
 In response the 2017 chemical weapons incident, the US conducted its first direct 
military attack against the Syrian government, attacking the air base from which the chemical 
weapons were deployed-- Al-Shayrat airfield. "The Pentagon announced that 59 Tomahawk 
cruise missiles had been fired at [the base]. The missiles were aimed at Syrian fighter jets, 
                                               
77 Rick Noack, “Like Obama, Macron said chemical weapons were his ‘red line’ in Syria. So now what?,” The 
Washington Post, 9 April 2018 
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hardened aircraft shelters, radar equipment, ammunition bunkers, sites for storing fuel and air 
defense systems."80  This attack is an important instance that highlights American reciprocity; 
American proactive, preemptive de-escalation measures and the Russian response to the 
airstrikes, as well as how they both fit into the game theory model will be discussed later. 
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Figure 7: April 7, 2017 Airstrike on Al-Shayrat Airfield81 
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Then, Nikki Haley told the UN on March 12, 2018 that "if the U.N. Security Council fails 
to act on Syria, Washington 'remains prepared to act if we must,' just as it did last year when it 
bombed Al-Shayrat Airfield over a deadly chemical weapons attack."82 This rhetoric was 
designed to deter future attacks and elicit cooperation from Syria, as well as to promote the US's 
reputation as a ‘tough guy’ willing to incur the costs of reciprocity to promote its interests. Most 
recently, the Syrian government conducted another chemical weapon attack on Douma on April 
7, 2018, testing this American rhetoric. The United States, as well as France, threatened a 
military attack in response to the chemical weapons incident.83 On April 12, 2018, "two US 
Navy destroyers armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles were in position and ready to be called 
into action, among other assets including jets and submarines should President Donald Trump 
make good on his threat to order a military strike on targets in Syria."84 On April 14, 2018, the 
US, France, and the UK conducted a joint operation against Syrian chemical weapons targets.85  
In all fairness to both administrations, the US cannot fully prevent chemical weapons 
attacks in Syria without putting troops on the ground and taking control of territory to destroy the 
weapons and air force entirely. However, it can deter their use. Additionally, in both cases, the 
Syrian government conducted another attack the next year, so deterrence is still inconclusive and 
may be determined by after the most recent US strike in Syria. As aforementioned, deterrence is 
learned from a pattern of reciprocity, not just an instance. Nonetheless, Obama's "red line" and 
lack of enforcement versus Trump's active retaliation represents the significance of reciprocity in 
reputation building and deterring other actors. 
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III. Tracking US-Russian Cooperation, Defection, and Reciprocity 
Now the IPD model discussed throughout this paper is applied to US-Russian interaction 
throughout the Syrian civil war, focusing on the time period between 2014 (when the 
American counter-IS coalition was officially formed) and the end of 2017 (when the US 
Department of State and other media sources reported about 98% of IS-controlled land had 
been taken back86). Although the IPD between Russia and the United States has continued 
into 2018, the situation is constantly changing and with the suppression of IS, the game has 
already changed substantially. In this chapter, the Prisoner’s Dilemma and theory of 
deterrence is related to major incidents reported on by the media, including Russian 
defections, American defections, and/or US-Russia cooperation. 
Since the international media focuses extensively on the war in Syria, there are many 
articles in existence about the US-Russian relationship and the conflict. Instead of citing 
them all (which would be nearly impossible), I have selected some of the more important 
stories to highlight how cooperation has developed between the two states. These articles 
clearly show that the cooperative relationship is self-enforcing, meaning (1) there is no 
central authority enforcing it, and (2) neither side is inclined to deviate substantially from the 
status quo. The situation remains a Prisoner’s Dilemma because each side is incentivized to 
utilize the fight against IS for its own self-interest but chooses not to because of credible 
threats of punishment for defections. 
Although the primary IPD analysis concerns the situation in Syria from 2014-2017 
because of the involvement of Russia and the US in these years, it is important to look at the 
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context leading up to American and Russian intervention and the current complexities that exist 
in the country now that the Islamic State is relatively incapacitated. Since there is a lot of context 
addressed in the first two chapters, this chapter just highlights a few major aspects of reputation 
building, defection, negative reciprocity (or lack thereof) in the two years prior to the 
establishment of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. One of the most notable criticisms of the 
Obama administration’s policy in Syria was his declaration of a chemical weapons ‘red line:’ 
“We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red 
line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being 
utilized. That would change my calculus.”87 However, it was not the red line itself that 
jeopardized Obama’s foreign policy, but rather the fact that he did not enforce that red line on 
August 21, 2013 when the Assad regime attacked Damascus with the nerve agent sarin. 
In response to the attack, Obama asked Congress to approve air strikes against the Assad 
regime, but the proposal lacked support, and the US only rhetorically condemned the use of 
chemical weapons in the conflict. This affected the United States’ reputation because it implied 
that future US military threats may not be credible, which inhibited America’s ability to enhance 
deterrence against the Russia coalition, including the Assad regime. However, the international 
response marked an important point in the US-Russia relationship because in September 2013, 
the two powers reached a deal regarding the chemical weapons in Syria. Following the 2013 
incident, multilateral negotiations among the UN, US, Russia, and Syria were conducted to 
prevent future chemical attacks.88 The UN Security Council (UNSC), with compliance from 
Russia, passed a resolution that mandated Syria to dispose of its chemical arsenal.89 This was one 
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of the first instances the international community saw mutual cooperation between the two sides 
in response to a major defection. 
 It is possible that the Russians realized that if the Assad regime continued its use of 
chemical weapons and direct ties were found with Russia that the United States would eventually 
respond with military action, and the Russians would lose credibility in the international 
community if they were proven to contribute to the chemical attacks (in which case, there was an 
aspect of deterrence despite the lack of an American military response). The cooperation also 
could have been an effort by Russia to keep the US out of the conflict. Whatever the motivation, 
the two sides agreed that by mid-2014, all of Assad’s chemical weapons had to be removed from 
the country and destroyed. By June 2014, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons reported that the last of Syria’s declared/known chemical weapons had been removed, 
but there could still be more.90 Since Assad has used chemical weapons again, either the entire 
arsenal was not declared and thus not destroyed, or the Syrian regime created more weapons. But 
this cooperation was still a significant point of defection by Russia-supported Assad and the 
preference of the two coalitions to negotiate and mutual cooperate instead of defect and escalate 
is notable. 
In 2013, the CIA began its covert operation “Timber Sycamore” in Syria, arming and 
training the SDF and other rebel forces to oppose the Assad regime and the Islamic State. 
 
“This support entailed ammunition and small arms, including rifles, rocket-propelled 
grenades, and valuable anti-tank guided missiles. Critically, it also entailed money for 
salaries, without which commanders could not recruit or retain fighters who would desert 
or defect to better-resourced extremist groups.”91  
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Then in September 2014, Congress approved a plan to arm and train Syrian rebels, and Obama 
began authorizing airstrikes against the Islamic State. 
Looking back at 2014, most international news sources discussed the near impossibility 
of cooperation between Washington and Moscow in Syria. The Washington Post claimed that 
“with mutual trust all but gone the United States and Russia enter a new year full of challenges 
that will test whether the world’s nuclear giants can salvage their relationship.”92 Reuters 
published an article titled,  “Russian suspicions of U.S. motives in Syria make cooperation 
unlikely,” and it stated: “The United States and Russia see Islamic State as a common enemy but 
are failing to overcome deep mutual distrust and agree on how to tackle the threat together, 
making any role for Moscow in the U.S.-led campaign unlikely, say U.S. officials.” The article 
cited “stark differences” between the “former Cold War foes” and stated that the US and 
Russia’s opposing interests in the outcome of the war “all but ruled out military collaboration in 
Syria against [the] Islamic State.”93 Additionally, James Goldgeier, a Kremlinologist at 
American University in Washington, “said the obstacles to U.S.-Russia cooperation against 
Islamic State appear too formidable to overcome soon.”94 
The media agencies seem fairly dramatic considering the US and Russia have actually 
been cooperating in Syria since at the latest 2013 and have recently even worked together to 
promote ceasefires and prevent military clashes and escalations.95 How has cooperation been 
achieved by the two sides in the midst of grave skepticism from the international community and 
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assertions of worsening relations between Washington and Moscow? As discussed thoroughly in 
this project, the threat of direct, conventional warfare between the two countries has made 
continuous defection too costly and risky. So, they have cooperated instead. Although the news 
in 2014 may have correctly identified US-Russian struggles moving ahead and identified limits 
of collaboration between Moscow and Washington, the way in which the two have cooperated is 
as simple as not mutually defecting. 
For instance, the two countries cooperated in December 2015 when they agreed on U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 2254, which ultimately led to the Geneva negotiations.96  
 
“In October and November of [2015], the International Syria Support Group, consisting 
of 20 states and international organizations—controversially including Iran—set out a 
blueprint for moving Syrian peace forward in the Vienna Statement. This was endorsed 
with U.N. Security Council resolution 2254. In keeping with the formulation of the 2012 
Geneva talks, resolution 2254 called for a January start to negotiations between the 
opposition and government, and elections within six months for a unity government.”97 
  
 
 
 Although these negotiations were halted and a ceasefire was not reached, this resolution 
marks another instance of US-Russia cooperation. Frequently Russia (often alongside China) 
vetoes UNSC resolutions regarding Syria, utilizing its power to unilaterally kill a resolution as a 
member of the Permanent Five (P5). Moscow has vetoed UNSC resolutions on Syria eight times: 
4 October 2011, 4 February 2012, 19 July 2012, 22 May 2014, 8 October 2016, 5 December 
2016, 28 February 2017, and 12 April 2017.98 These vetoes are examples of Russian defections 
against the United States while the US cooperates. In these cases, Moscow chose to defeat a 
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UNSC resolution on Syria to protect the Assad regime and its interests in Syria, often at the 
expense of the United States. In these cases, there has not been much negative reciprocity, 
probably because UNSC resolutions lack enforcement mechanisms and a veto is not a significant 
tangible defection. From a game theory perspective, when Russia vetoes UNSC resolutions, the 
US forgives instead of utilizing a tit-for-tat strategy. Of course, there is rhetoric used against 
Russia and the US remembers these defections, but Washington also realizes that defection on 
the next ‘play’ could lead to worse outcomes in Syria. Moreover, despite these eight Russian 
defections, over 20 UNSC resolutions have been passed regarding Syria, many with unanimous 
votes (no abstentions).99 Therefore, Russia has cooperated in certain instances at the (at least 
rhetorical) expense of the Syrian government. Moscow knows that if it does not ever cooperate, 
the United States will also cease its pattern of cooperation. In this case, both sides would conduct 
iterated mutual defections, which could result in a war that neither side wants to fight. 
In 2016, there was continued global rhetoric about detrimental relations between 
Washington and Moscow. For instance, a Forbes author claimed that tensions between the US 
and Russia in Syria were at an all-time high.100 However, in the same year, the Washington Post 
published an article on the distinct possibility of cooperation between the two countries. The 
latter article argued that Washington and Moscow have several common goals in Syria, including 
the defeat of the Islamic State and other extremist groups, as well as the preservation of Syria as 
a single state. In order to overcome their significant differences—like their different preferences 
regarding the continuation of the Assad regime and the distinction of rebel factions from terrorist 
groups—the two powers have made compromises. For example, the US and EU have mentioned 
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that they are willing to allow Assad initially remain in power and negotiate a regime change, and 
Russia “has also indicated that it is not bound to support the Assad family forever.”101 However, 
the Russians say they believe a new power structure can be discussed only after the territory of 
Syria is secured and the Syrian state survives.”102 Additionally, both countries have supported 
and continue to support political solutions with all major factions present at the bargaining table, 
even though they support opposing actors. It is important to cut through the noise and drama of 
mainstream media and look at how the US and Russia actually interact.  
Overall, there are high tensions between the US and Russia regarding Syria, and many 
other issues as well. However, the relations between the two in Syria are a representation of 
cooperation to avoid war. In further support of this claim, there are several more defections and 
reactions to highlight from 2016 and subsequently 2017. A significant example of Russian 
defection in the IPD occurred on June 5, 2016, when “nearly 40 airstrikes by Russian and Syrian 
government warplanes hit rebel-held areas in and around Syria's Aleppo city… residents said, 
Reuters reported.”103 As Stratfor explained, “Full control of Aleppo would be a huge prize for 
Syrian President Bashar al Assad. Russia's military intervention in support of Damascus in 
September has helped bolster al Assad's government.”104 In response to these airstrikes, 
Washington and Moscow initiated talks that focused their efforts on the Islamic State, which in 
the frame of IPD, appears to represent forgiveness on behalf of the US and reinitiating mutual 
cooperation. 
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The US is not the only side to forgive, either. In a US-coalition airstrike on September 
17, 2016, the warplanes hit Syrian troops instead of their Islamic State targets.  
 
“A U.S. official said that the airstrikes Saturday were in an area believed to be where the 
Islamic State was operating, and the desired effect was to destroy the militants' fighting 
positions, weapons and equipment. The official said the pilots were given a window of 67 
minutes to conduct the attacks. The Russians did not notify the United States that 
coalition aircraft were hitting Syrian military positions until 55 minutes into the airstrike, 
the official said. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook said that the coalition's air 
operations center had notified the Russians that coalition aircraft would be operating in 
the area at the time, and the Russians had not voiced concerns. The U.S. military 
regularly talks with the Russians to avoid mishaps in the air, but the two countries don't 
cooperate on targets or military operations.”105  
 
 
 Instead of an explicit military retaliation, though, Moscow accused the US of perfidy. 
However, within a few days, there was an attack on a UN aid convoy in Syria, and the Trump 
administration accused Moscow of the incident.106 If Russia was responsible for the attack, it 
definitely looks like retaliation for the US strike against Syrian troops, attempting to create a 
credible reputation using a tit-for-tat strategy. The goal would have been to deter the US from 
future defections by showing that by defecting, the US endangers UN aid workers—innocents. It 
is very important to note, though, that this instance of American military action follows a trend in 
Syria: the Americans always alert the Russians of impending military activity to prevent 
escalation. As will be discussed later, the Russian and American militaries in Syria actually have 
constant access to direct communication with one another, and they use this line frequently to 
avoid accidents and disasters.   
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Furthermore in 2016, tit-for-tat strategy was executed by both Washington and Moscow. 
On September 28, the Dutch-led team of investigators that was looking into the shooting down of 
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine released their findings to the world. 
 
 “The investigation, undertaken by a multinational team of seasoned investigators, 
announced that they had discovered ‘irrefutable evidence’ that the missile was Russian and that it 
had been fired from the region of eastern Ukraine controlled by pro-Russian rebels. The team 
also documented the journey of the missile system, which had been transported into eastern 
Ukraine from Russia, and then snuck back into Russia the evening after its use against the 
civilian airliner.”107  
 
 
Although this does not directly involve Syria, the United States’s reaction did.  
In response to the findings, the US State Department threatened to discontinue American-
Russian cooperation against the Islamic State and warned of possible subsequent terrorist attacks 
against the Russians because ISIS would be more free to attack Russian targets. Then the US 
announced that on October 3, it would suspend talks with Moscow about cooperation in Syria 
because of the continuation of the Russian-backed siege of Aleppo and its staggering civilian 
casualties. In retaliation, that same day, the Russians claimed it was going to withdraw from the 
Plutonium Management & Disposition Agreement, “which was designed to reduce each sides' 
stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium as well as to keep it out of the hands of terrorists.”108 
Then, rhetoric from the two sides became un-credible tit-for-tat assertions, escalating threats of 
war. But the reciprocal actions were toothless words instead of military activities, showing that 
both sides actually preferred cooperating to going to war.  
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Therefore, it is arguable that there have been smaller games of Chicken within the larger 
IPD, with each side attempting to speed at the other without actually crashing, but both sides 
revert to the status quo of caution and cooperation against the Islamic State. “The Kremlin's 
bellicose posturing is less to be taken seriously as a threat of nuclear war and more aimed at 
deterring the United States and its European allies from intervening strongly in Syria, and 
possibly also to deter Washington from taking strong steps to punish Moscow for the [election] 
hacking for which it has been blamed.”109 Each side has utilized their reputations and tit-for-tat 
strategy to prevent going to war. 
The year of 2017 may be the most formative year for US-Russian cooperation against the 
Islamic State—which makes sense since cooperation and deterrence develop over time, after 
forming reputations and learning from strategies of other actors. In 2017, the US-led coalition 
claimed that 98% of IS’s territory in Iraq and Syria had been reclaimed, Iraq’s government 
announced that its war against the terrorist organization was over, and Putin pulled out some of 
the Russian troops stationed in Syria.110 Furthermore, the US ended its covert program 
supporting the Syrian rebels.111 Instead of escalating the conflict after the near-defeat of one of 
the major actors in the war (like Turkey did when it invaded Syria against the Kurds in 2018), 
the US and Russia made maneuvers to re-stabilize the state and prevent the waste of military 
resources. Re-stabilizing measures and the decrease in military presence and involvement from 
the two great powers marks the common goal of ending the Syrian war and not taking over the 
country or inciting a great power war. For instance, when the SDF finally recaptured Raqqa—the 
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de facto capital of the Islamic State’s caliphate from 2014 to 2017—the Turkey from the US 
coalition and Russia and Iran from the Russian coalition negotiated four de-escalation zones in 
the country.112 The de-escalation zones are a significant marker of US-Russia cooperation, even 
though conflict persists in the regions. The priority of the two coalitions to promote structured 
peace and negotiate de-escalation zones highlights the priority of mutual cooperation. 
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Figure 8: Syria De-escalation Zones 2017  
“Zone 1: Idlib province, as well as northeastern areas of Latakia province, western areas of 
Aleppo province and northern areas of Hama province. There are more than one million civilians 
in this zone and its rebel factions are dominated by an al-Qaeda-linked alliance. 
 
Zone 2: The Rastan and Talbiseh enclave in northern Homs province. There are approximately 
180,000 civilians in this zone and its network of rebel groups includes al-Qaeda-linked fighters. 
 
Zone 3: Eastern Ghouta in the northern Damascus countryside. Controlled by Jaish al-Islam, a 
powerful rebel faction that was participating in the Astana talks, it is home to about 690,000 
civilians. This zone does not include the adjacent, government-besieged area of Qaboun. 
 
Zone 4: The rebel-controlled south along the border with Jordan that includes parts of Deraa and 
Quneitra provinces. Up to 800,000 civilians live there.” 
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In addition to formative formal cooperation that happened this year, one of the most 
significant defections and instances of negative reciprocity in the civil war occurred in April 
2017. President Assad’s military conducted a chemical attack against the city of Khan Shaykhun, 
killing approximately 100 civilians and wounding many more, on April 4.113 After medical 
analysis of victims and the compilation of intelligence, the United States, Turkey, and other 
international actors confidently claimed that the nerve agent sarin was used in the attack.114 
Although Syria and Russia have provided alternative explanations for the incident, chemical 
weapons experts and the American intelligence community have deemed their stories “highly 
implausible”,115 and the greater international community firmly believes Assad was behind the 
attack.116 The April 2017 chemical attack was one of the largest in Syria since August 21, 2013, 
when Assad’s regime used chemical weapons to attack a region outside of Damascus and killed 
over 1300 civilians.117 This usage of chemical warfare breaks Syria’s agreement in a 2013 treaty 
to discontinue its use of chemical weapons and disregards the prohibition of chemical weapons 
in international customary law.118 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon condemned the chemical 
attacks, saying they constitute crimes against humanity.119  
In response to this breach of international law, the United States bombed Shayrat 
Airfield, the Syrian air base allegedly responsible for the chemical attack, to send a message of 
deterrence to the Syrian regime.120 This was the first direct US military attack against the Syrian 
government’s forces. If the Russians were also involved in the chemical attack, the incident 
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marks a greater defection from their side, and the US attack represents a retaliation to the 
Russian-coalition defection as a mechanism to deter future attacks. The retaliation of the US 
against Syria was a bold defection that the Russians responded to with de-escalation measures, 
assuming because they feared the results of possible escalation.  
Moreover, the United States military alerted the Russians of the impending attack ahead 
of time in order to remove Russians from the base. The American military strategically targeted 
areas that would ensure no collateral damage was inflicted on the Russians. In fact, the Russians 
had sufficient air defense capabilities around the air base to shoot at the Tomahawk missiles but 
chose not to do so.121 Therefore, Moscow had little incentive to aggressively retaliate on behalf 
of the Russian military since the attack was explicitly targeting the Syrian government resources. 
They also had no desire to escalate this retaliatory defection by the US and had every intention of 
forgiving Washington and continuing mutual cooperation, but for its soft reputation, the Kremlin 
needed to speak out against the Americans with some threat. 
In response to the retaliatory strikes against the Syrian government airfield, Russia 
retaliated by ‘suspending’ its Air Space Deconfliction Agreement with the US. Specifically, 
“Russia suspended the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents 
in the course of operations in Syria signed with the U.S..”122 The deconfliction agreement was 
created in 2015 so American and Russian forces could communicate at any hour of the day using 
a “flight safety hotline run out of the Combined Air Operations Center at U.S. Central 
Command.” The hotline had previously been used by a Russian official to alert the US coalition 
in September 2016 “that the targets they were attacking and believed to be Islamic State forces 
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were, in fact, Syrian government-aligned forces.” The US had also used the hotline to inform the 
Russians in March 2017 “that Russian and Syrian fighters were bombing U.S.-backed fighters 
rather than Islamic State forces.”123 Thus, the suspension of the MOU could have had significant 
consequences. 
 However, this announcement was made for purely rhetorical purposes, attempting to 
show reciprocity and buffer Russia’s reputation without any substantial repercussions or tangible 
results. After the apparent suspension occurred, “senior US military officials said the 
deconfliction hotline was still open and Russians were answering their calls,” and one official 
assured reporters that “we have a Memorandum of Understanding with the Russian forces within 
that area, in Syria, and that Memorandum of Understanding agreement is still being used and 
being supported.” He continued, saying that “despite Russian comments and media reports... 
we’ve had discussions with the Russians after the attack to confirm that the Memorandum of 
Agreement is still active, and they confirmed that it is.”124 Therefore, it is very clear that despite 
the Russian’s dissatisfaction with the United States and its attack against Syria, the threat of war 
was too great to actually stop the direct ground communication that the two militaries utilize 
regularly to avoid conflict. Instead, “The United States and Russian militaries continue to 
interact on a limited set of issues, such as the safety of operations for deployed forces. The 
recurring calls regarding the safety of flight over Syria are an example of this dynamic. The 
United States and Russia also maintain senior-level lines of communication as appropriate.”125 
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Figure 9: De-confliction Zones in Syria 
 
 
Throughout the war, international intervention and relationships have evolved 
significantly. There have been two different UN special envoys for Syria—Staffan de Mistura 
until 2014 and then Kofi Annan—each running into problems when trying to help the Syrian 
people.126 Washington and Moscow created specific lines of communication to protect air spaces 
and fighter jets above Syria and also drew s line of non-confrontation on the Euphrates. 
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Moreover, “in May 2017, Russia, Iran and Turkey called for the setup of four de-escalation 
zones in Syria, over which Syrian and Russian fighter jets were not expected to fly.”127 
Therefore, despite the animosity and rhetorical escalation of relations between the US 
and Russia, the two have managed to cooperate to avoid a great power war, and they seem to 
have deterred each other from escalating tensions unnecessarily. All negative reciprocal actions 
between the two actors have been proportional, and both have actively attempted to avoid the 
other’s military. The two sides are so cautious of war that even when American troops retaliated 
to a surprise attack in Deir al-Zour, killing about 100 Russian mercenaries in the counterattack, 
the Russians and Americans both kept the confrontation quiet. Even though it was “the deadliest 
U.S.-Russia clash since the Cold War,”128 Russia did not retaliate and the US did not escalate the 
situation in order to preserve status quo peace and avoid war. Deterrence has predominantly 
solved the US-Russia IPD, and has been so effective, that even a direct military clash has 
resulted in increased de-escalation measures.   
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IV. The Future of Cooperation  
Although the future of the American-Russian relationship in Syria or the outcome of its civil 
war cannot be perfectly predicted, this game theory application can be utilized to make educated 
guesses about what might happen moving forward.  
 It may seem like once the Islamic State is defeated, the United States and Russia will 
have little incentive to cooperate. The shared goal will be achieved, the common enemy 
defeated, and what was once a non-zero-sum game may evolve into a zero-sum game. Once the 
Islamic State is gone, the two sides could have completely opposing interests in Syria—one side 
supporting the rebels and the other President Assad.  In this case, a success in Syria for the US 
would mean a failure for Russia. Therefore, since there would be no opportunity or incentive for 
cooperation as a zero-sum game, the United States and Russia would cease to cooperate.  
 However, there are several issues with this prediction. First of all, it assumes the only 
reason the US and Russia cooperated to begin with was the common goal to defeat the Islamic 
State. The common enemy may have ensured the game was not zero-sum and this allowed for 
cooperation and mutual benefit, but it was not the only reason for mutual cooperation. The major 
motivation for US-Russia cooperation was not the Islamic State, but rather deterrence and the 
prevention of a great power war. That threat of war will remain even after the Islamic State is 
effectively removed from the Syrian conflict.  
 Moreover, the predominant consensus among the international community is that 
President Assad will win the war. At this point, the nearly inevitable defeat of the rebels is just 
being disastrously prolonged as more civilians and cites are being destroyed. Therefore, the 
United States has little to no incentive to go into Syria and promote the rebel factions, and 
Washington is likely to grievously accept Assad's retention of power. There is no point in going 
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to war over Syria, at least not for the US. Russia may prefer war to backing down to the US 
because of its strategic interests in Syria, but the United States should not consider the payoff of 
war with Russia in Syria better than conceding to the Russia-Syria coalition’s military victory. 
Thus, the interests of Russia and the US are not in direct and complete opposition. The United 
States has humanitarian and political reasons to support an end to the war in Syria, and even if 
Russia wants to prolong the war in order to distract the US or make Syria more subordinate to its 
great power sponsor, Moscow wants the war to end with Assad still in charge and US military 
presence out of the country. And since the US is inclined to work with that outcome, there are 
similar interests that are compatible enough to prevent the game from turning zero-sum.  
Now with the poisoning of a former Russian spy on UK soil on March 4, 2018 and 
aggressive rhetoric from both the US and the Russians about preparing for war, it is not 
surprising that people are paranoid about American-Russian relations in Syria. However, despite 
these instances of Russian and American aggression, cooperation will continue after the defeat of 
the Islamic State because the threat of war will persist, and the United States and international 
community has all but fully recognized that the war in Syria is Assad’s to win.  There is no point 
in the United States escalating the situation in Syria to a war with Russia, or vice versa. Syria is 
not a hinge of power or worth starting World War III over, and both sides are well aware of this 
fact. Additionally, the de-escalation zones remain in existence and the de-escalation hotline will 
likely remain active despite rhetoric from the respective leaders, as has been the case in the past. 
It is unlikely that something will happen to change this status quo of communication and de-
escalation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Thus, the game that the United States and Russia will play after the defeat of the Islamic 
State will look different than the IPD discussed throughout this paper. Nonetheless, there will 
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still be opportunity for cooperation between the adversarial powers, and it is likely that both 
sides will take advantage of this cooperation in order to avoid great power conflict.  
 
 
But That’s Not What the Media Says… 
 It is true that much of the media, and even the President of the United States (POTUS), is 
highlighting grave tensions and prospective escalations between Washington and Moscow. News 
sources currently discuss ‘Cold War II’ and claim Washington and Moscow have the worst US-
Russia relations since the Cold War, or according to President Trump, the worst relations ever.129   
 
Figure 9: Trump Calls American-Russian Relations in 2018 the Worst Ever130 
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The Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center Dmitri Trenin published an article in 
Foreign Policy titled, “The New Cold War Is Boiling Over in Syria: 
Trump’s latest airstrikes are a new U.S.-Russian missile crisis that risks devastating escalation.” 
In the article he states: 
 
 
“The new confrontation between Russia and the United States has thus reached its first 
“missile crisis” moment…. There is no longer symmetry, balance, or respect between the 
parties. There is also no heightened fear of a nuclear Armageddon, which has the 
paradoxical effect of making it far easier to slide beyond the point of no return.”131 
 
 
 
 The Washington Post published an article by Anton Troianovski titled, “Putin ally warns 
of arms race as Russia considers response to U.S. nuclear stance.” In the article, Troianovski 
states: 
  
“One of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s closest associates warned in an interview 
Wednesday that the U.S. and Russia are approaching a new arms race — the latest sign 
that geopolitical tensions are undermining nuclear arms control.” 
 
  
And in a CNN article titled, “Syria strikes: The Real Impact is Moscow,” author Tim 
Lister states:  
 
“US President Donald Trump appeared to surrender any hope of a working relationship 
with Moscow… The greatest impact of these strikes is that they will deepen the visceral 
hostility that characterizes relations between the US and Russia, now at their lowest ebb 
in decades."132 
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It can be alarming when the POTUS and prominent global writers and thinkers make 
exaggerated claims about US-Russian relations and arms races. But at the end of the day, 
President Trump uses significant rhetoric that does not always translate into policy, and Putin 
does the same. If trends continue, there will not be an arms race or another Cold War over Syria, 
and the US and Russia will continue to cooperate instead. One of the most important conclusions 
to be drawn and lessons to be learned from this project is that with the overwhelming access to 
information and saturation of news in society, readers must be critical of media. Specifically, 
audiences should critically analyze information provided to them before jumping to conclusions. 
All of the information in this thesis was taken from open source material—meaning anyone 
could recognize cooperation between the US and Russia and trends in behavior and rhetoric.  
 
 
But What About Trump’s New Policies? 
Some of Trump’s policies seem to negate this prediction completely. After all, he has 
announced that the US will pull its troops out of Syria after the death of an American—Master 
Sgt. Jonathan J. Dunbar—and a British—Sgt. Matt Tonroe—serviceman in a roadside bomb 
attack.133 Moreover, the POTUS ordered the State Department to freeze $200 million in aid 
dedicated to rebuilding Syria. If this happens, ultimately the burden of re-stabilization and post-
war peace will fall almost completely on Russia, and the US will back out and focus on other 
issues. But once again, the implementation of these policies is questionable. In fact, the 
immediacy of Trump’s panic and desire to remove the American military from Syria strengthens 
the prediction. President Trump fears escalation and war to the point that when an American 
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soldier died, he was prepared to immediately leave—ignoring America’s foreign policy 
interests—instead of retaliating and risking escalation.  
Trump’s aforementioned policies do not make much sense. The United States has little 
interest in completely backing out of Syria because then the country will be left in the hands of 
both Russia and Iran, most likely becoming a proxy state.  A central tenet of the United States’s 
foreign policy in is countering Iran and its influence. Backing out of the conflict in Syria 
completely would be ceding victory to Iran. Iran was the first state to intervene in support of the 
Assad regime, and it is desperately attempting to gain post-war Syria as an ally and proxy. The 
US and its allies in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, are opposed to the spread of 
Iranian influence, and with escalations between Israel and Iran, the United States will need to 
remain in Syria to anchor the power balance. Additionally, because the Syrian state is all but 
completely demolished, the re-stabilization effort is going to require great power intervention, 
especially in order to maintain peace. The United States will be a part of this re-stabilization 
effort because of its resources and foreign policy interests.  
If the United States completely pulls out of Syria, the Russians and Iranians will need to 
become the enforcers of peace and re-stabilization. This burden lift would be good for the US 
because Washington would endure fewer costs and have resources to devote towards other 
priorities. However, if the US leaves, it would completely cede the nation to its adversaries and 
open up a vacuum for escalated conflict. It is unlikely these Tehran and Moscow will effectively 
promote peace. Iran and Russia may have insufficient resources to end conflict and rebuild the 
nation. There are also fissures within the Moscow-Tehran coalition, and a possible war brewing 
between Iran and Israel, which is hardly indicative of peace.134 Because no one wants war with 
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the United States--because of the deterrence achieved by US military presence in Syria—major 
actors limit military operations. Turkey wants the US to leave Syria so it can better pursue its 
military destruction of the Kurds. Russia wants the US to leave so its military can act freely. 
Israel wants US support against Iran, but Iran wants the US to leave because it does not want to 
attack the US military. Therefore, US presence and involvement serves as a great power anchor 
and deterrent to increased escalation. Take away this anchor, and the conflict will likely only 
worsen as coalitions break apart and individual actors pursue self-interests at the expense of 
peace. 
 
Figure 10: Tensions Mount Among Individual Actors in Syria135 
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Overall, the Syrian civil war is a state-centered civil war plagued by an inherent commitment 
problem. Whoever wins the war—at this point, Assad—cannot commit to protecting the rebel 
forces once in power. He indisputably will not protect them. The major point of the operation on 
Eastern Ghouta was to destroy the last of the rebels’ strongholds and continue to wipe out 
Assad’s opposition. The only way the war will end is if the commitment problem is solved, 
which usually involves the destruction of the other side. But in this case, it could also be solved 
through third-party intervention and accountability mechanisms. Likely, the US will have to, and 
want to, remain involved in Syria. 
 
 
Conclusion 
  When stuck in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, cooperation is difficult to achieve. Usually solving 
a PD requires outside enforcement or incentivizing mechanisms to force actors to cooperate. 
Cooperation in this sense is not necessarily working together, or collaborating, but rather 
choosing not to defect based on rational self-interest. In Syria, there is a seemingly 
counterintuitive phenomenon. The United States and Russia--- powers with historic tensions and 
animosity, as well as opposing interests in the outcome of the war in Syria—have somehow 
managed to cooperate against the Islamic State while also avoiding exploiting each other to the 
point of great power war. Solving a PD proves challenging for even the closest of allies, there is 
no central power in the international system to coerce or enforce, and there are no selective 
incentives offered to either side to promote cooperation. Therefore, something else has forced the 
two adversaries to cooperate with one another: the threat of great power war. 
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 In Syria, the US and Russia are inclined to defect because they have different interests in 
the state and region, and they would each greatly benefit from taking advantage of the other’s 
cooperation (exploitation). Obviously, there are trends of cooperation between the two states 
despite their opposing interests, so why have we seen this mutual cooperation instead of more 
exploitation? Every escalation between the two sides thus far has de-escalated, so obviously 
there is a mechanism that exhausts the desire to unilaterally defect. This mechanism is 
deterrence. Both the US and Russia believe that the threat of war with the other side is credible, 
and both agree that it would be too costly and that Syria is not worth a great power war. Thus, 
this threat of war is more influential than their urge to reciprocate defections, making both sides 
relatively forgiving and cooperative.  
 The case study of US-Russian relations in Syria strongly supports Axelrod’s argument 
that it is beneficial to have a strategy that involves being nice (not the first to defect), retaliatory 
(defect after being defected against), and forgiving (allowing cooperation to develop after a 
defection or strand of defections). Both the US and Russia protect themselves and their 
international image when refraining from defection, and like the US air strikes against Assad, 
retaliating to a defection is easier to justify than being the first to defect. In Syria, there are 
obvious examples of political and military retaliation in order to build the two sides’ reputations 
and remain credible actors in the conflict. Finally, because both sides are so committed to 
avoiding war, they are quick to forgive and re-establish cooperation. In some cases, retaliatory 
measures are only rhetoric and forgiveness is immediate, like with the continuous use of the de-
escalation hotline despite threats from both countries to cut off communication after defections. 
The case study also supports Axelrod’s assertion that trust and comradery are not mandatory 
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preconditions for cooperation, and overcoming the other side is not the marker of success. Doing 
well in n IPD involves eliciting cooperation.  
Another interesting pattern related to deterrence is the nature of unilateral defections in 
Syria. Oftentimes the US only defects in retaliation to a defection from Damascus or Moscow. 
Most of the time these retaliatory defections are not military actions, either. The only military 
retaliations from the US have been the two major air strikes against the Syrian government and 
the self-defense of the US troops against their assailants in Deir al-Zour, which included Russian 
mercenaries. This highlights the prevention of escalation. Additionally, Russia stopped many of 
its defections on the ground in Syria after being accused of attacking US-backed rebels instead of 
the Islamic State. Most Russian defections have involved indirect and direct support of the Assad 
regime or international incidents like the downing of the civilian aircraft and the poisoning of the 
former Russian spy in the UK. Although the latter two incidents did not involve Syria directly, 
they both resulted in US reciprocity, including threats and the expulsion of Russian diplomats 
from the US, respectively.   
However, even though mutual cooperation has been established and accepted as the 
status quo, cooperation is not perfect or guaranteed. Recently in 2018, Russia forbade the US 
from utilizing air space on the ‘Russian side’ of Syria to attack the Islamic State. Additionally, 
neither the US nor Russia can control actors on the ground. For example, Washington cannot 
control Ankara and its operation against the Kurds, and Moscow likely was not in control of the 
Russian mercenaries who attacked the US troops on the ground. Therefore, even though it makes 
sense to simplify the analysis into a two-player game based on coalition, the coalitions are not 
actually monolithic.  There are intra-coalition fissures in each coalition that threaten peace and 
cooperation, which is actually representative of Olson’s Collective Action Theory. Thus, it 
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appears that there is more than one ‘game’ taking place in Syria, including intra-coalition 
collective action problems on both sides and then the IPD between the US and Russia. The 
important thing for the IPD analysis is that each coalition has a great power anchor that is 
committed to avoiding direct war with the other.  
Moreover, it seems that deterrence is different for different members of the Russian 
coalition. The Russians believe that the threat of war with the US is credible, and therefore, they 
avoid direct conflict with the American military. Russia desires parity with the US and acutely 
fears direct conflict. Mutual cooperation developed between the US and Russia against the 
Islamic State in Syria because of effective punishment strategies and this threat of great power 
war. However, deterring Assad is a different game altogether because Damascus knows that it 
has a great-power body guard in Moscow with whom the US does not want to go to war. So, the 
first US airstrike against Damascus in 2017 did not deter Assad from using chemical weapons 
again a year later. Although deterrence is usually only established after several retaliations (so air 
strikes cannot be completely ruled out yet as deterrents against Assad), it is clear that since 
Assad's motives and fears are different, so must be the mechanism of deterrence. Assad wants to 
regain control of the country and defeat the opposition at all costs, and as long as he is avoiding 
the US military, he knows the US will probably not invade or escalate conflict. The benefits of 
destroying Assad’s opposition may outweigh the costs of a few retaliatory air strikes from the 
Americans. 
Nonetheless, Assad is not attacking Americans, which means he is still effectively 
avoiding war with the US. Looking at US history, it is unlikely Washington will go to war with 
Syria unless Damascus directly attacks the US military. Even then, with all of the actors and 
conflicts involved in the ongoing war, it would be riskier for Washington to go to war than to 
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just remove its military presence on the ground. Therefore, deterrence is probably working on a 
broad scale against the Syrian government (Assad knows good and well not to attack 
Americans). On a smaller scale, though, it seems that Syria is so focused on the civil war that it 
is willing to commit atrocities even at the possible expense of military facilities and resources. 
The effectiveness of deterrence against the Syrian regime, at least for preventing the use of 
chemical weapons, is still inconclusive, but the US and Russia have managed to cooperate 
against IS because of the threat a war neither side wants to fight.  
  So why have the US and Russia cooperated in Syria? Because it is better than the 
alternative of iterated mutual defections resulting in war between the two powers and their 
coalitions. The existence of effective punishment strategies on both sides, and the credible threat 
that a spiral of reciprocity would lead to war, has deterred both the United States and Russia 
from major defections. The two sides choose the best alternative to exploitation—mutual 
cooperation to achieve the social optimum of defeating the Islamic State. Both Washington and 
Moscow know that exploitations result in retaliations because each actor has a well-established 
reputation of reciprocity; therefore, it is only detrimental in the long term to continuously defect 
in an effort to exploit. Eventually constant exploitation between the two powers would lead to 
iterated mutual defections and escalation. Thus, the United States and Russia managed to solve 
their Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
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